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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
On November 1, 2015, the U.S. Sentencing Commission promulgated a 
slate of amendments that capped off a “comprehensive, multi-year study” of 
the economic crime provisions in the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.1  Section 
2B1.1 of the Guidelines provides judges with advisory sentencing recom-
mendations for defendants convicted of offenses like fraud and theft,2 which 
are among the most commonly prosecuted in the federal system.3  Yet judges 
depart from the economic crime Guidelines at higher rates than almost any 
other major Guidelines provision,4 leading one Commissioner to lament that 
Section 2B1.1 has “lost the backing of a large part of the judiciary.”5  The 
Commission’s study and the resulting amendments sought to reassess the 
economic crime Guidelines in light of these concerns.6 
The most important driver of sentences for economic crimes under the 
Guidelines is the amount of pecuniary harm that the defendant either actually 
caused or intended to cause.7  The “loss enhancement” received special focus 
 
 1. Final Priorities for Amendment Cycle, 79 Fed. Reg. 49378, 49379 (notice of 
final priorities Aug. 20, 2014); see also Sentencing Guidelines for United States 
Courts, 80 Fed. Reg. 25782, 25782 (notice of submission to Congress of amendments 
May 5, 2015) (announcing amendments to the Guidelines effective Nov. 1, 2015). 
 2. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 
2015). 
 3. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2014 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING 
STATISTICS tbl. 17 (2015) [hereinafter U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2014 SOURCEBOOK 
OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS] (showing that, in fiscal year 2014, 12.1% of all 
federal offenders were sentenced under Section 2B1.1). 
 4. Id. at tbl. 27A (showing that defendants convicted of fraud were given be-
low-Guidelines sentences 28.3% of the time, which is more often than any other ma-
jor offense category other than child pornography production). 
 5. Letter from Jonathan J. Wroblewski, Director, Office of Policy and Legisla-
tion, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to the Honorable William K. Sessions III, Chair, U.S. 
Sentencing Commission 3 (June 28, 2010), reprinted in 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 282, 
284 (2011).  Jonathan J. Wroblewski was an ex-officio Commissioner on the U.S. 
Sentencing Commission through his position as the Director of the Office of Policy 
and Legislation.  Meet the Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, U.S. DEP’T 
JUST., https://www.justice.gov/olp/jonathan-wroblewski (last updated Jan. 26, 2016). 
 6. See Chief Judge Patti Saris, Chair, U.S. Sentencing Commission, Keynote 
Address at the Regulatory Offenses & Criminal Law Conference Ctr. on the Admin. 
of Criminal Law 1 (Apr. 14, 2015), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf 
/news/speeches-and-articles/speech_saris_20150414.pdf [hereinafter Saris, Keynote 
Address on the Administration of Criminal Law] (explaining that “[t]he Commission 
heard concerns from some judges that the economic crime guideline was too high, 
that it produced unreasonable sentences, and that it was ‘fundamentally broken,’” 
even as surveys indicated that other judges approved of the current Guidelines). 
 7. § 2B1.1(b)(1). 
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in the recent review of Section 2B1.1,8 but the Commission ultimately re-
buffed calls from advocacy groups for a fundamental reimagining of loss’s 
role.9  The November 2015 amendments did, however, resolve a lingering 
circuit split by clarifying the definition of “intended loss.”10  Whereas Section 
2B1.1 had previously left the word “intended” undefined, the new amend-
ment explained that intended loss means “the pecuniary harm that the defend-
ant purposely sought to inflict.”11 
This Article provides the first extended analysis of the new intended loss 
provision, and it does so primarily through the framework of rules and stand-
ards.12  Generally speaking, a rule is “framed in terms of concepts that can be 
applied without explicit reference to the principles or policies that might have 
motivated the rule, usually by specifying operative facts that trigger the 
 
 8. Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 77 Fed. Reg. 51113, 51113 
(notice of final priorities Aug. 23, 2012) (listing “examination of the loss table and the 
definition of loss” as policy priorities). 
 9. See, e.g., Theodore Simon, NACDL Comments on Proposed Amendments for 
2015 Cycle, NAT’L ASS’N CRIM. DEF. LAWYERS 8–9 (Mar. 18, 2015), 
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/amendment-process/public-
comment/20150318/NACDL.pdf (“NACDL continues to believe that § 2B1.1 should 
be re-conceptualized to . . . reduc[e] the outsize role that loss amount currently plays 
in sentencing determinations.”); Cory L. Andrews & Markham S. Chenoweth, Com-
ments of the Washington Legal Foundation to the United States Sentencing Commis-
sion Concerning Proposed Amendments to § 2B1.1 of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, 
WASH. LEGAL FOUND. 3 (Mar. 18, 2015), http://www.wlf.org/upload/litigation 
/misc/WLFComments--USSC(Mar182015)(2).pdf (“[T]he fundamental problem in 
white-collar sentencing lies with the oversized role that loss amount plays in the loss 
calculation, a problem that remains wholly unaddressed by the Commission’s pro-
posed amendment.”). 
 10. Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 80 Fed. Reg. 25782, 25791 
(notice of submission to Congress of amendments May 5, 2015). 
 11. § 2B1.1 n.3(A)(ii)(I) (emphasis added). 
 12. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 
DUKE L.J. 557, 560 (1992) (defining rules and standards in terms of “the extent to 
which efforts to give content to the law are undertaken before or after individuals 
act”) (emphasis omitted); FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A 
PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN 
LIFE 78 (1993) (describing rules as directives that “exclud[e] from consideration some 
properties of the particular event that a particularistic decision procedure would rec-
ognize”); Pierre J. Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 381 (1985) 
(distinguishing rules and standards); Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Admin-
istrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65, 67–71 (1983) (advocating criteria for choosing the 
proper form of legal directives in the context of administrative law); Douglas G. Baird 
& Robert Weisberg, Rules, Standards, and the Battle of the Forms: A Reassessment of 
§ 2-207, 68 VA. L. REV. 1217, 1221 (1982) (characterizing the choice between rules 
and standards as a “fundamental question in jurisprudence”); Duncan Kennedy, Form 
and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1685–87 (1976) 
(differentiating rules and standards). 
3
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rule.”13  In contrast, the use of standards “involve[s] recourse to justificatory 
principles or policies, mediated by some form of balancing that does not 
specify in advance the result thereof.”14  For example, a law prohibiting driv-
ing over sixty-five miles per hour is a prototypical rule; negligence is a proto-
typical standard.15  In the context of sentencing, rules and standards are pri-
marily distinguished by when a sentencing directive is given its specific con-
tent (before the sentencing hearing or during it) and who decides its content 
(Congress, the Commission, or the judge).16  The pros and cons of rules and 
standards have been analyzed in depth in many areas of law,17 but they have 
only recently been applied systematically to sentencing.18 
The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines adopt a predominantly rule-oriented 
approach to sentencing.  Under the Guidelines, judges determine whether 
predetermined factual triggers exist, and each trigger has a designated effect 
on the recommended sentence.19  This framework promotes uniformity and 
predictability – two characteristics traditionally associated with rules – but 
those virtues are never absolute when imposing punishment.  Congress has 
mandated that sentences give weight to other normative values as well, most 
notably proportionality.20  The Guidelines seek to achieve proportionality 
within their rule-based framework by adjusting sentences based on the pres-
ence of specified facts about the offender and offense.  In the economic crime 
Guidelines, the most important such facts are actual and intended loss.  The 
 
 13. Dale A. Nance, Rules, Standards, and the Internal Point of View, 75 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1287, 1295 (2006). 
 14. Id. 
 15. See Kaplow, supra note 12, at 560, 564; Russell D. Covey, Rules, Standards, 
Sentencing, and the Nature of Law, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 447, 460 (2016). 
 16. See Covey, supra note 15, at 450 (“In general, rules are legal directives that 
define the content of the law ex ante through prescription of concrete empirical trig-
gers that dictate determinate responses.  Standards, in contrast, leave the determina-
tion of the directive’s content to the applier of the standard ex post, rely on evaluative 
triggers rather than empirical ones, and guide rather than determine the choice of 
response.”).  See also Kaplow, supra note 12, at 560 (“[T]he only distinction between 
rules and standards is the extent to which efforts to give content to the law are under-
taken before or after individuals act.”) (emphasis omitted); Jacob Schuman, Sentenc-
ing Rules and Standards: How We Decide Criminal Punishment, 83 TENN. L. REV. 1, 
20 (2015) (“The first way to think about sentence determinacy is in terms of institu-
tional choice, or rather, who should decide punishment.”) (emphasis added). 
 17. See, e.g., supra note 12. 
 18. See generally Schuman, supra note 16; Covey, supra note 15.  To the au-
thor’s knowledge, the association between the modern advisory Guidelines’ system 
and standards-based governance was first noted by Adam H. Morse.  Adam H. Morse, 
Rules, Standards, and Fractured Courts, 35 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 559, 595–604 
(2010). 
 19. See Covey, supra note 15, at 465. 
 20. See U.S SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1(3) (U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N 2015); 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (2012) (instructing the Commission to 
“avoid[] unwarranted sentencing disparities”). 
4
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Commission has explained that actual and intended loss are designed to func-
tion as rule-based proxies for the seriousness of the offense and the culpabil-
ity of the offender, respectively – two of the traditional metrics used to evalu-
ate the proportionality of punishment.21 
This Article argues that one of the principal reasons that the economic 
crime Guidelines systematically generate sentencing recommendations that 
many judges consider disproportionately harsh – resulting in high rates of 
below-Guidelines sentences – is that intended loss is a fatally flawed proxy 
for culpability.  By its nature, culpability is too complex and heterogeneous 
an inquiry to be accurately represented by the pecuniary harm that the de-
fendant intended to inflict, and therefore the sentencing enhancements it trig-
gers are not well calibrated to the holistic culpability of the offender.  While 
the Commission adopted the new “purposeful loss” amendment ostensibly to 
improve the correlation between culpability and intended loss, in fact, it is 
likely to make the “fit” between them even more problematic by excluding a 
significant range of highly culpable conduct – criminal acts that the defendant 
subjectively expected would result in losses, but that were not undertaken 
with the purpose of imposing them. 
While there are several ways in which the intended loss rule could be re-
formulated to improve its correlation with culpability, these reforms will nev-
er be fully satisfactory as a theoretical or practical matter.  Ultimately, a more 
promising approach would involve shifting the culpability inquiry away from 
the rule-like intended loss measure and toward a standard that allows judges 
to evaluate culpability directly.  This would be a departure from current 
Guidelines practice in some respects, though there are partial precedents, 
most notably the Guidelines’ method of determining fines for convicted cor-
porations.  In many ways, however, it would also be more consistent with the 
now-advisory status of the Guidelines.  Current doctrine requires judges to 
evaluate every sentence independently in light of a range of statutorily de-
fined penological objectives, and a standard-like culpability inquiry could 
help judges in this task.  A well-crafted standard that is cabined within the 
Guidelines’ superstructure and requires judges to follow a structured deci-
sion-making procedure holds the promise of striking an attractive balance 
between the uniformity and predictability of rules and the proportionality of 
standards in the context of economic crime sentencing – and possibly other 
areas of the Guidelines as well. 
Part II of this Article evaluates sentencing policy through the lens of the 
rules-and-standards framework.  The fraud Guidelines and the often-
determinative role of the loss enhancement in sentencing are described in Part 
III, with a focus on the role of intended loss in the overall Guidelines struc-
ture.  Part IV describes the circuit split over whether an objective or subjec-
tive inquiry was required to calculate intended loss.  It then analyzes the 
Commission’s response to the split – the 2015 amendment redefining intend-
ed loss as “purposeful” loss.  In the criminal law, “purpose” almost always 
 
 21. See infra notes 119, 129–30 and accompanying text. 
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means one’s aspiration or conscious objective.  By requiring an intended pe-
cuniary loss to be purposeful, the Commission has set such a high threshold 
that, if “purpose” is interpreted conventionally, a significant subset of culpa-
ble offenders may be found to have no intended loss whatsoever.  This Part 
closes by suggesting an alternative standard – subjectively expected loss – 
that would be more workable and better reflect the full spectrum of culpable 
conduct.  Finally, Part V examines why, regardless of how it is defined, in-
tended loss is likely to be a fatally flawed proxy for culpability.  This Part 
looks at two possible avenues for reform: a more complex rule that would 
allow for multiple inputs relevant to the defendant’s blameworthiness, and a 
standard-based approach that would permit judges to evaluate culpability 
directly.  It concludes by arguing that a properly tailored standard – one that 
structures the decision-making process of judges and incorporates the Com-
mission’s sentencing expertise – would be the best way for the economic 
crimes Guidelines to assist judges in executing their statutory sentencing du-
ties.  A brief conclusion follows. 
II.  SENTENCING GUIDELINES THROUGH THE LENS OF RULES AND 
STANDARDS 
Federal sentencing law over the last century can be categorized into 
three distinct phases, each marked by an abrupt and decisive transition: a 
sentencing regime in which judges had almost unchecked discretion gave 
way to mandatory sentencing Guidelines, which, in turn, were supplanted by 
a hybrid system requiring judges to impose punishments that advanced a 
range of statutory objectives, while using the Guidelines as a benchmark.  
The strengths and weaknesses of each sentencing regime can be usefully un-
derstood using the familiar framework of rules and standards. 
A.  The Origins of the Guidelines 
In the decades prior to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, federal 
judges had expansive discretion to assign criminal punishments.22  The nearly 
universal “indeterminate” sentencing model cast sentencing judges as clini-
cian-like experts tasked with crafting punishments that maximized the de-
fendant’s prospects for rehabilitation.23  From that premise, it followed that  
 22. See, e.g., Douglas A. Berman, Distinguishing Offense Conduct and Offender 
Characteristics in Modern Sentencing Reforms, 58 STAN. L. REV. 277, 278 (2005) 
(describing the discretion afforded to judges in the years before modern sentencing 
reforms as “broad and essentially unregulated”). 
 23. Frank O. Bowman, III, The Quality of Mercy Must Be Restrained, and Other 
Lessons in Learning to Love the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 
679, 684–85 (“The rehabilitative ideal, what some have called the ‘medical model’ of 
sentencing, was at flood tide [under indeterminate sentencing].  The article of faith 
upon which sentencing rested was that criminal deviance could be treated like any 
other disorder.”).  The “indeterminacy” of sentencing was a function both of the dis-
6
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judges were allowed to take into account any fact about the offender or of-
fense that would help them design an individualized rehabilitative “treat-
ment.”24  Congress prescribed broad statutory sentencing ranges, but judges’ 
sentencing decisions within those ranges were effectively insulated from ap-
pellate review.25 
By the late 1970s, however, a bipartisan consensus had emerged against 
indeterminate sentencing.26  Although numerous factors contributed to wide-
spread dissatisfaction with the status quo, the two core objections were, first, 
that judges had less expertise in rehabilitating offenders than had been as-
sumed (as shown by persistently high rates of crime and recidivism), and, 
second, that sentencing had become capricious and lawless.27  According to 
leading reform advocate Marvin Frankel, sentencing practice was infected by 
“unruliness, the absence of rational ordering, [and] the unbridled power of 
sentencers to be arbitrary and discriminatory.”28 
The coalition of reformers offered a policy solution: sentencing Guide-
lines written by politically insulated, expert-led panels, designed to bring 
transparency, accountability, and the rule of law to sentencing.29  In 1980, 
Minnesota became the first state to adopt mandatory guidelines,30 and Con-
gress followed suit four years later with the Sentencing Reform Act (“the 
 
cretion judges enjoyed to issue sentences anywhere within the statutory range (on the 
front end) and the ability of parole boards to determine the actual term a defendant 
served (on the back end).  See id. at 680–82. 
 24. See Nancy Gertner, A Short History of American Sentencing: Too Little Law, 
Too Much Law, or Just Right, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 691, 695 (2010); see 
also Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949) (“Reformation and rehabilita-
tion of offenders have become important goals of criminal jurisprudence.”); see also 
id. at 249–50 (arguing that limitations on a judge’s access to information at sentenc-
ing would “undermine modern penological procedural policies”). 
 25. See Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 431 (1974) (“[T]he general 
proposition [is] that once it is determined that a sentence is within the limitations set 
forth in the statute under which it is imposed, appellate review is at an end.”). 
 26. See Berman, supra note 22, at 279–80; see also Robert Weisberg, How Sen-
tencing Commissions Turned Out to Be a Good Idea, 12 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 179, 
183–84 (2007) (explaining that Guidelines’ systems arose in response to a “double-
sided attack [that] was a remarkable, if adventitious, event whereby clashing [liberal 
and conservative] ideologies found a common enemy and (in theory) a common solu-
tion”). 
 27. See KATE STITH & JOSE A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 33–37 (1998) (describing the development of 
determinate sentencing Guidelines by reformers in the 1970s); see also Weisberg, 
supra note 26, at 184. 
 28. See MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 49 
(1972). 
 29. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 27, at 33–37. 
 30. Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Principles in Theory and Practice, 22 CRIME & 
JUST. 363, 388 (1997). 
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Act”), which passed with near-unanimous support.31  The Act created a new 
agency in the judicial branch – the U.S. Sentencing Commission – and au-
thorized it both to “establish sentencing policies” that “assure the meeting of 
the purposes of sentencing as set forth in [18 U.S.C. §] 3553(a)(2)” (namely, 
retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation) and “provide cer-
tainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing, avoiding unwar-
ranted sentencing disparities.”32  Congress also specified the means to those 
ends: federal sentencing Guidelines, which would be mandatory for judges in 
most cases.33 
B.  The Rules/Standards Framework 
As many scholars have recognized, legal directives such as the Guide-
lines can be classified on a spectrum with “rules” on one end and “standards” 
on the other.34  A rule-like directive “binds a decisionmaker to respond in a 
determinate way to the presence of delimited triggering facts.  Rules aim to 
confine the decisionmaker to facts, leaving irreducibly arbitrary and subjec-
tive value choices to be worked out elsewhere” – specifically, by the rule-
maker.35  Standards, meanwhile, “tend[] to collapse decisionmaking back into 
the direct application of the background principle or policy to a fact situation” 
and “allow the decisionmaker to take into account all relevant factors or the 
totality of the circumstances.”36 
One commonly used illustration of the difference between rules and 
standards is a speed limit.37  A legislature concerned that high-speed driving 
increases the risk of accidents could pass a bright-line rule (“no driver may 
drive over sixty-five miles per hour”) or a standard (“no driver may drive at 
an unsafe speed”).  With the rule, the legislature makes an ex ante generaliza-
tion about the maximum safe speed, and the officials tasked with applying the 
rule need only determine whether a driver was, in fact, driving over the pre-
defined limit.  With the standard, on the other hand, the legislature delegates 
responsibility for determining whether a particular driver was driving at an 
“unsafe speed” to the officials enforcing the rule.  That decision would be 
made in light of the array of facts (speed in conjunction with weather, driver 
 
 31. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 27, at 45–48 (recounting the passage of 
the Sentencing Reform Act). 
 32. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1) (2012). 
 33. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (making the Guidelines mandatory unless the 
court found an aggravating or mitigating circumstance not accounted for by the 
Commission), partially abrogated by United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
 34. See sources cited supra note 12. 
 35. Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. 
REV. 22, 58 (1992). 
 36. Id. at 58–59. 
 37. See Kaplow, supra note 12, at 560; see also Robert E. King & Cass R. Sun-
stein, Doing Without Speed Limits, 79 B.U. L. REV. 155, 155–56 (1999). 
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skill, traffic conditions, etc.) that the officials consider relevant to evaluating 
the safety of the driver’s speed under the circumstances. 
The speed limit example helps demonstrate the complementary virtues 
and vices of rules and standards.  Because the content of a rule is defined 
narrowly ex ante – before the person subject to the rule acts – rules promote 
uniformity, predictability, and stability, while risking regimentation, intransi-
gence, and rigidity.38  Standards promote individualization, flexibility, and 
dynamism, while risking capriciousness, manipulability, and variability.39  At 
least in theory, speed limits provide clear notice to drivers of what conduct is 
prohibited and clear instructions to police officers and judges on how to de-
termine who is violating the law.  By the same token, however, the rule will 
be both over-inclusive and under-inclusive with respect to its purported goal 
of reducing accidents – an attentive driver on an empty freeway might be able 
to drive safely at eighty miles per hour, for example, and in a blizzard, it 
might be quite unsafe for anyone to drive the posted speed limit.40  A stand-
ard enables officials to account for these facts, but because the task of defin-
ing “unsafe speed” is delegated to police officers and judges, there is a 
heightened risk of unpredictable and inconsistent outcomes. 
By mandating the creation of the federal sentencing Guidelines, Con-
gress shifted sentencing law away from the amorphous and idiosyncratic 
standards of judges and toward a rule-driven framework created by the ex-
pert-led Commission.41  But the Commission was given significant leeway to 
determine how precisely to operationalize rule-based sentencing.42  The 
Commission understood the twin objectives of the Guidelines to be the ad-
 
 38. See Schlag, supra note 12, at 400 (listing traditionally recognized virtues and 
vices of rules and standards, while expressing skepticism about the virtues-and-vices 
paradigm). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Skeptics of the rules/standards dialectic point out that legal directives have a 
tendency to converge when actually applied in the real world; for example, police 
officers reserve their ticket-issuing authority for unsafe driving rather than technical 
violations of the speed limit, and in the sentencing context, prosecutors under-charge 
crimes to avoid mandatory minimum sentences.  Covey, supra note 15, at 484–85; see 
also Schlag, supra note 12, at 405–06. 
 41. See Covey, supra note 15, at 448–49; Richard A. Bierschbach & Stephanos 
Bibas, What’s Wrong With Sentencing Equality?, 102 VA. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 
2016) (“In practice, the institutions that individualize sentences based on granular, ex 
post, and process-oriented factors tend to be disaggregated decision-making bodies, 
like individual judges . . . .  A focus on equalizing outcomes thus has a centripetal 
force to it, pulling sentencing away from those bodies to more centralized, higher-
level institutions like sentencing commissions.”). 
 42. As the Supreme Court has noted, the Commission “enjoy[ed] significant 
discretion in formulating guidelines.” Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 377 
(1989); see also id. at 414 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“It should be apparent . . . that the 
decisions made by the Commission are far from technical, but are heavily laden (or 
ought to be) with value judgments and policy assessments.”). 
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vancement of uniformity and proportionality in federal sentencing.43  Uni-
formity of application is a paradigmatic benefit of rules.  By specifying a 
limited set of relevant factors and assigning specific consequences to them, 
rules constrain the officials charged with applying the rule, thereby reducing 
their discretion and the risk of bias.44  But uniformity cannot be the only goal 
of sentencing.45  Whereas a rule that said every offender receives a five-year 
sentence would be perfectly uniform, it would also violate Congress’s ad-
monition that sentences should be proportional to the crime.46  And while it is 
easy enough to conclude that a murderer should receive more severe punish-
ment than a cat burglar, the factors that can serve to make one murder (or 
murderer) worse than another, or one burglary (or burglar) worse than anoth-
er, are much more numerous, fine-grained, complex, and difficult to define ex 
ante – and, thus, more difficult to frame as a rule.  Crafting rules that would 
consistently generate proportional sentences was perhaps the greatest chal-
lenge the inaugural Commission faced in designing the U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines.47 
C.  The Rule-Oriented Structure of the Guidelines 
In general terms, the Guidelines provide extensive instructions – over 
600 pages today – on how to determine the sentencing range that the Com-
mission considers appropriate for every combination of offender and offense.  
The primary inputs are the defendant’s criminal history and the nature of the 
crime: 258 possible sentencing ranges are arrayed in a grid, with six “criminal 
history categories” as the horizontal axis and forty-three “offense levels” as 
the vertical axis.48  Both the criminal history category and offense level are 
determined mechanically based on facts found by the judge during the sen-
tencing hearing.49  The offense level is the more complex inquiry and consists 
of two components: the “base offense level” set by the crime of conviction, 
 
 43. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A(3) (U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N 2015) (describing honesty, uniformity, and proportionality as “the three 
objectives that Congress sought to achieve in enacting the Sentencing Reform Act of 
1984,” but noting that “[h]onesty [was] easy to achieve” by abolishing parole). 
 44. See Sullivan, supra note 35, at 62. 
 45. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A(3) (“There is a tension, 
however, between the mandate of uniformity and the mandate of proportionality.”). 
 46. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) (2012) (instructing judges to issue 
sentences that “reflect the seriousness of the offense” and “provide just punishment 
for the offense”), partially abrogated by United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 
(2005). 
 47. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A(3); see also Mistretta, 
488 U.S. at 379. 
 48. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A. 
 49. The U.S. Probation Office prepares a presentence report, calculating the 
Guidelines’ sentence based on its assessment of the facts of the case, which is provid-
ed to the defendant, the prosecutor, and the judge.  Id. § 6A1.1; see also id. § 6A1.3. 
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and “specific offense characteristics” designed to incorporate distinguishing 
facts about the offender or offense.50 
In theory, every judge would calculate the same criminal history score 
and final offense level in every case, thereby fulfilling the Commission’s 
mandate to improve sentencing uniformity.  But since rules are over- and 
under-inclusive with respect to their underlying goals (here, uniform yet pro-
portional sentences), the Commission created mechanisms that allowed judg-
es to account for “multifarious, fleeting, special, narrow facts that utterly 
resist generalization.”51 
The Commission employed two principal means to achieve this goal.  
The first was that each box on the grid contained a sentencing range.52  Judg-
es had full discretion to choose a final sentence from within the identified 
range.  The second was to empower judges to issue out-of-range sentences if 
they found that a given case involved aggravating or mitigating circumstanc-
es that had not been adequately accounted for by the Commission.53  The 
Commission itself identified some recurring fact patterns that might warrant a 
departure; for example, Section 2B1.1 suggests that judges consider departing 
upward (i.e., issuing a sentence above the Guidelines range) if the crime was 
motivated by the desire to inflict emotional harm54 and downward (i.e., issu-
ing a sentence below the Guidelines range) if the defendant’s ill-gotten gains 
were an overpayment of legitimate emergency relief aid.55  Judges also had, 
and continue to have, the ability to issue departures based on other case-
specific factors that they believed were not sufficiently represented in the 
Guidelines’ rules.56 
On balance, however, these standard-like elements had less influence on 
sentences than might have been expected.  The sentencing ranges contained  
 50. Id. § 1B1.3. 
 51. Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 99 (1996) (quoting Cooter & Gell v. 
Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 404 (1990)); see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A(4)(b) (recognizing the need for some degree of judicial discre-
tion within the Guidelines’ system). 
 52. 28 U.S.C. § 994(b) (2012) (requiring the Commission to establish sentencing 
ranges for each federal crime). 
 53. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1). 
 54. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 2B1.1 cmt. n.20(A)–(B) (coun-
seling upward departures for offenses involving, among other things, aggravating 
non-monetary objectives, a substantial risk of loss beyond those measured by the loss 
calculation, or the use of an unlawfully obtained means of identification). 
 55. Id. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.20(D).  See also id. § 2B1.1 n.20(C) (recommending a 
downward departure for securities frauds in which the aggregate loss is large but 
diffuse). 
 56. See id. § 5K2.0 (“The sentencing court may depart from the applicable 
Guideline range if . . . there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance . . . of a 
kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Com-
mission . . . .”); see also id. ch. 1, pt. A(4)(b) (“[I]t is difficult to prescribe a single set 
of Guidelines that encompasses the vast range of human conduct potentially relevant 
to a sentencing decision.”). 
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in the Guidelines were relatively narrow; by statute, the top of the range 
could be no more than 25% higher than the bottom.57  Therefore, even though 
the within-Guidelines sentencing decision was entirely left to the judge, that 
choice often had only a marginal effect on the final sentence.  In addition, the 
Commission expressly discouraged judges from considering many potentially 
relevant factors when issuing departures (especially ones related to personal 
characteristics of the defendant),58 and appellate courts scrutinized out-of-
range sentences closely.59  As a result of these constraints, some judges com-
plained that they were little more than “glorified accountants and bookkeep-
ers” under the Guidelines.60 
D.  United States v. Booker and a Hybrid System of Rules and Stand-
ards 
The mandatory rule-oriented framework of the Guidelines ultimately 
proved to be their constitutional undoing.  In 2005, over fifteen years after the 
Guidelines went into effect, the Supreme Court held in United States v. Book-
er that the Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial be-
cause a defendant’s maximum sentence under all applicable laws – which 
included the mandatory Guidelines – was determined by facts found by the 
 
 57. 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(2); see also Frank O. Bowman, III, Comment on Pro-
posed Amendments to Economic Crime Guideline, § 2B1.1, U.S. SENT’G COMMISSION 
4 (Feb. 19, 2015), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/amendment-
process/public-hearings-and-meetings/20150312/Bowman.pdf [hereinafter Bowman, 
Comment on Proposed Amendments to Economic Crime Guideline] (“Key to under-
standing the current dysfunction of the fraud Guideline for high-loss offenders is 
recognition that, because of the logarithmic character of the 43-level Sentencing Ta-
ble, each increase in offense level has an ever-greater absolute effect on sentence 
length the higher one goes up the Table.”) (emphasis omitted). 
 58. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. H, introductory cmt. 
(“Generally, the most appropriate use of specific offender characteristics is to consid-
er them not as a reason for a sentence outside the applicable [G]uideline range but for 
other reasons, such as in determining the sentence within the applicable [G]uideline 
range . . . .”). 
 59. The Supreme Court held in Koon v. United States that all aspects of the de-
parture decision should be reviewed deferentially, but Congress responded by man-
dating that departure decisions be reviewed de novo.  518 U.S. 81, 91 (2003); see also 
18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)(4).  The Guidelines still factor into appellate review post-Booker.  
See United States v. Gall, 552 U.S. 38, 47 (2007) (“In reviewing the reasonableness 
of a sentence outside the Guidelines range, appellate courts may therefore take the 
degree of variance into account and consider the extent of a deviation from the Guide-
lines.”). 
 60. Judge Lynn Winmill, United States Sentencing Commission: Public Hearing, 
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judge at sentencing rather than by the jury.61  For example, in order to return 
a conviction in a wire fraud prosecution, a jury must find beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant devised, with the intent to defraud, a scheme that 
used a wire communication.62  Under Section 2B1.1 of the Guidelines, how-
ever, the jury’s determination that those elements have been met only triggers 
the base offense level of seven that applies to all wire frauds; the final Guide-
lines range would depend on the judge’s findings, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, regarding the amount of loss, the number of victims, the degree of 
sophistication of the offense, and every other applicable specific offense 
characteristic.63  Thus, to preserve the protection afforded to defendants by 
the jury-trial right, the Court held that “[a]ny fact (other than a prior convic-
tion) which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum au-
thorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be 
admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”64 
The Court did not, however, strike down the Guidelines in their entire-
ty.65  Instead, it merely severed the statutory provisions that made the Guide-
lines mandatory, converting them instead into an “effectively advisory” sys-
tem.66  This approach solved the Sixth Amendment quandary because the 
longest possible sentence would be set by the statutory maximum associated 
with the crime of conviction rather than the Guidelines’ range.  According to 
the Court, there is no constitutional violation if a judge considers the advice 
of the Commission in choosing a final sentence, so long as the legally opera-
tive minimum and maximum sentences were set by the statute that the de-
fendant was convicted of violating.67 
Over the course of more than twenty post-Booker sentencing opinions,68 
the Supreme Court has outlined the requirements of an emergent federal sen-
tencing procedure that “aims to achieve uniformity by ensuring that sentenc- 
 61. 543 U.S. 220, 244 (2005). 
 62. See, e.g., NINTH CIRCUIT PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 8.124 
(2014), http://www3.ce9.uscourts.gov/jury-instructions/node/583. 
 63. The Court held that the power of judges to depart from the Guidelines did not 
obviate the constitutional problem because “departures are not available in every case, 
and in fact are unavailable in most.  In most cases, as a matter of law, the Commission 
will have adequately taken all relevant factors into account, and no departure will be 
legally permissible.  In those instances, the judge is bound to impose a sentence with-
in the Guidelines range.”  Booker, 543 U.S. at 234. 
 64. Id. at 244. 
 65. See id. at 245. 
 66. See id. at 259.  The merits and remedial opinions in Booker were each decid-
ed by a 5-4 vote, with only Justice Ginsburg joining the majority in each.  Id. at 226. 
 67. Id. at 259; see also Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2155 (2013) 
(extending the reasoning of Booker to hold that facts necessary to trigger a mandatory 
minimum sentence must either be admitted by the defendant or found by a jury be-
yond a reasonable doubt). 
 68. See Frank O. Bowman, III, Dead Law Walking: The Surprising Tenacity of 
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 1227, 1228 n.2 (2014) [herein-
after Bowman, Dead Law Walking]. 
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ing decisions are anchored by the Guidelines and that they remain a meaning-
ful benchmark through the process of appellate review.”69  The Court requires 
judges to follow three steps.  First, they must calculate the range provided by 
the Guidelines, which remain the “starting point and . . . initial benchmark” 
for all federal sentencing.70  The failure to correctly calculate the Guidelines 
range is almost always a reversible error that requires resentencing.71  Sec-
ond, the parties must be allowed to argue for their desired sentence.72  And 
third, judges must make an “individualized assessment” of the proper sen-
tence – without “presum[ing] that the Guidelines range is reasonable” – that 
takes into account various factors identified by the Sentencing Reform Act 
and codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).73  Under this statute, which was largely 
overshadowed by the mandatory Guidelines prior to Booker, Congress pro-
vided broad, standard-like instructions to judges. 
The court, in determining the particular sentence to be imposed, shall 
consider: 
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and 
characteristics of the defendant; 
(2) the need for the sentence imposed— 
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for 
the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; 
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; 
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and 
 
 69. Peugh v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2072, 2083 (2013); see also Gall v. United 
States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007) (“If [a judge] decides that an outside-Guidelines sen-
tence is warranted, he must consider the extent of the deviation and ensure that the 
justification is sufficiently compelling to support the degree of the variance.  We find 
it uncontroversial that a major departure should be supported by a more significant 
justification than a minor one.”). 
 70. Gall, 552 U.S. at 49 (“As a matter of administration and to secure nationwide 
consistency, the Guidelines should be the starting point and the initial benchmark.”) 
(citing United States v. Rita, 551 U.S. 338, 347–48 (2007)). 
 71. See Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338, 1347 (2016) (“[I]n 
the ordinary case a defendant will satisfy his burden to show prejudice by pointing to 
the application of an incorrect, higher Guidelines range and the sentence he received 
thereunder.”). 
 72. Gall, 552 U.S. at 49 (explaining that the judge should then “giv[e] both par-
ties an opportunity to argue for whatever sentence they deem appropriate”). 
 73. Id. at 49–50 (“[T]he district judge should then consider all of 
the § 3553(a) factors to determine whether they support the sentence requested by a 
party.  In so doing, he may not presume that the Guidelines range is reasonable.  He 
must make an individualized assessment based on the facts presented.”) (citations 
omitted). 
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(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational 
training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most 
effective manner; 
(3) the kinds of sentences available; 
(4) the kinds of sentence[s] and the sentencing range established [by 
the Guidelines;] 
(5) any pertinent policy statement [issued by the Commission;] 
(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defend-
ants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar con-
duct; and 
(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.74 
Ultimately, Congress instructed judges to ensure that sentences are “suf-
ficient, but not greater than necessary” to comply with the four purposes of 
sentencing in paragraph (2) above – retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, 
and rehabilitation.75  Congress did not, however, explain how to balance 
those competing and sometimes contradictory purposes, nor how to account 
for the other factors in § 3553(a). 
In sum, sentencing now involves a “hybrid” model:76 a rule-based calcu-
lation of the advisory Guidelines range, followed by a standard-like assess-
ment of whether the Guidelines’ recommendation accords with the factors in 
§ 3553(a) when considered ex post in light of all relevant circumstances. 
Despite the apparently radical changes to sentencing practice imposed 
by Booker, over the last fifteen years, “[t]he endurance of the Guidelines, but 
more particularly the degree to which they continue to drive actual sentences, 
has surprised nearly everyone.”77  As the Court itself has noted, “In less than 
20% of cases since 2007 have district courts imposed above- or below-
Guidelines sentences absent a Government motion.”78  Commentators have  
 74. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012), partially abrogated by United States v. Booker, 
543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
 75. Id. 
 76. See Schuman, supra note 16, at 14 (describing post-Booker sentencing prac-
tice as “a new, determinate/indeterminate approach to punishment: a hybrid model”). 
 77. See Bowman, Dead Law Walking, supra note 68, at 1230; id. at 1269 (re-
marking that the Guidelines “still matter nearly as much as they did on the day before 
Booker was decided”); see also Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338, 
1346 (2016) (“The Commission’s statistics demonstrate the real and pervasive effect 
the Guidelines have on sentencing.  In most cases district courts continue to impose 
‘either within-Guidelines sentences or sentences that depart downward from the 
Guidelines on the Government’s motion.’”) (quoting Peugh v. United States, 133 S. 
Ct. 2072, 2084 (2015)). 
 78. Molina-Martinez, 136 S. Ct. at 1346 (citation omitted). 
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proposed several psychologically-driven rationales for judges’ continued 
deference to the Guidelines, including the anchoring effect of the initial 
Guidelines calculation,79 judges’ predisposition to defer to legal rules,80 iner-
tia from the pre-Booker era,81 and moral cowardice.82  But while these expla-
nations may have some influence on the margins, there can be little doubt 
given the persistently high rate of within-Guidelines sentences that most 
judges consider the Guidelines substantively reasonable most of the time.  
Even after independently evaluating the appropriateness of a sentence under 
the standards identified in § 3553(a), judges usually conclude that the Guide-
lines’ broad-brush rules have prescribed a fair and proportional punishment.83  
Thus, the Supreme Court’s observation that “the sentencing judge and the 
Commission [are] carrying out the same basic § 3553(a) objectives, the one, 
at retail, the other at wholesale,” appears correct84 – even if, in practice, some 
Guidelines do so better than others. 
III.  THE FRAUD GUIDELINES AND THE LOSS ENHANCEMENT 
Although the Guidelines remain highly influential, judges do not defer 
to them at equal rates across all types of offenses.  One of the least-followed 
sets of rules is found in Section 2B1.1, which covers economic crimes.  Sec-
tion 2B1.1 applies to over 300 federal offenses – more than any other section 
of the Guidelines – including larceny, embezzlement, receipt of stolen proper-
 
 79. See Mark W. Bennett, Confronting Cognitive “Anchoring Effect” and “Blind 
Spot” Biases in Federal Sentencing: A Modest Solution for Reforming a Fundamental 
Flaw, 104 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 489, 495 (2014). 
 80. See Bowman, Dead Law Walking, supra note 68, at 1269 (“Judges are men 
and women of the law.  They naturally look for rules and endeavor to apply them. . . .  
[T]he Guidelines still look and feel like ‘law.’”). 
 81. See Jed S. Rakoff, Why the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Should Be 
Scrapped, 28 CRIM. JUST. 26, 29 (2014) (“[T]here are increasingly few judges who 
have ever had any sentencing experience except under a guidelines regime.”); see 
also Crystal S. Yang, Have Interjudge Sentencing Disparities Increased in an Adviso-
ry Guidelines Regime? Evidence from Booker, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1268, 1277 (2014) 
(“Judges who have no prior experience sentencing under the mandatory Guidelines 
regime are more likely to depart from the Guidelines-recommended range than their 
pre-Booker counterparts, suggesting that newer judges are less anchored to the Guide-
lines.”). 
 82. See Rakoff, supra note 81, at 29 (“[S]entencing, as any judge will tell you, is 
no fun, and following the Guidelines permits the judge to avoid the difficult moral 
questions that sentencing inevitably presents.”). 
 83. See Bowman, Dead Law Walking, supra note 68, at 1249 (stating that even 
though judges “now operate in an advisory regime,” “the judiciary has decidedly not 
enlisted in a broad-gauge revolt against the severity levels prescribed by the Sentenc-
ing Guidelines”). 
 84. United States v. Rita, 551 U.S. 338, 348 (2007). 
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ty, property destruction, forgery, deceit, and fraud.85  (Going forward, this 
Article will use “fraud” as shorthand for all of them.)  In total, about 12% of 
federal sentences are issued under Section 2B1.1, making it the third most 
common major category of offenses after immigration violations and drug 
trafficking.86  In order to capture relevant sentencing considerations across 
this broad range of cases, the Commission structured the fraud Guidelines 
with the amount of loss as the predominant sentencing factor.  This decision 
has proven controversial, and it raises difficult questions about whether loss 
can bear the weight the Commission has placed on it. 
A.  The Fraud Guidelines and Their Discontents 
Members of the judiciary have labeled Section 2B1.1 “fundamentally 
flawed”87 and “a black stain on common sense”88 and decried the “utter trav-
esty of justice that sometimes results from the [fraud] [G]uidelines’ fetish 
with abstract arithmetic.”89  This discontent is not confined to a handful of 
vocal objectors; judges in fraud cases issue non-Guidelines sentences – more 
specifically, below-Guidelines sentences – at significantly higher rates than 
average for other offenses.  In 2014, slightly over 30% of Section 2B1.1 sen-
tences were lower than the Guidelines’ recommendation without a govern-
ment-sponsored departure90 (compared to 21% across all offenses), which 
was the highest rate among any major offense category except child pornog-
raphy production.91  Overall, including cases in which the government rec-
ommended a below-Guidelines sentence, less than half (46%) of fraud sen-
 
 85. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. A (U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N 2015) (statutory index specifying the Guidelines associated with various 
statutory crimes); see id. § 2B1.1 introductory cmt. 
 86. See Quick Facts: Theft, Property Destruction, and Fraud Offenses, U.S. 
SENT’G COMMISSION 1 (2015), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-
and-publications/quick-facts/Quick_Facts_Theft_Property_Destruction_Fraud.pdf.  
See also U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2014 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING 
STATISTICS, supra note 3, at tbl. 17. 
 87. United States v. Corsey, 723 F.3d 366, 377 (2d Cir. 2013) (Underhill, J., 
concurring). 
 88. United States v. Parris, 573 F. Supp. 2d 744, 754 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). 
 89. United States v. Adelson, 441 F. Supp. 2d 506, 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 90. See Quick Facts: Theft, Property Destruction, and Fraud Offenses, supra 
note 86, at 2.  The most common government-sponsored departure is granted to de-
fendants who offer substantial assistance to the prosecution.  See U.S. SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1. 
 91. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2014 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING 
STATISTICS, supra note 3, at tbl. 27A.  The 30% figure is derived from aggregating all 
of the offenses listed in Table 27A that are punished under Section 2B1.1.  See id.  
Child pornography production is the only crime with a higher rate of below-range 
sentences, at 44%.  Id. 
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tences were within the Guidelines range.92  The rate of departures under Sec-
tion 2B1.1 has always been among the highest in the Guidelines, and it has 
increased annually in each of the last five years.93  Whereas the frequency of 
below-range sentences for most categories of crime has remained surprisingly 
constant, “[t]he only anomalous case type is economic crime, in which the 
average [G]uideline minimum has increased steadily[,] . . . while the average 
sentence imposed has risen only slightly, from about nineteen months in FY 
2008 to about twenty-three months in 2013.”94  Over that same period, the 
average differential between the minimum sentence recommended by the 
fraud Guidelines and the actual sentence imposed has quadrupled from two 
months to roughly eight.95  In addition, when judges issue sentences below 
the advisory range in fraud cases, the reduction is significantly greater, on a 
percentage basis, than for any other major offense category.96 
Since judges are statutorily required to issue sentences that are propor-
tional in light of the factors listed in § 3553(a), the relatively high rate of sen-
tencing departures in fraud cases strongly suggests that judges find that the 
fraud Guidelines’ rules often fail to advance the policy objectives identified 
by Congress.  More specifically, the relatively high number of downward 
sentencing departures indicates a systematic tendency of the fraud Guidelines 
to over-punish in light of Congress’s mandate to sentence federal offenders 
proportionally.  This indicates that there is a structural problem with the way 
the fraud Guidelines operationalize the sentencing factors in § 3553(a). 
B.  The Purposes and Structure of the Fraud Guidelines 
To understand why the Guidelines tend to overestimate fraud sentences, 
it is necessary to understand the means by which the Commission converted 
the universe of potentially relevant sentencing considerations into the rule-
based framework in Section 2B1.1.  The base offense level for fraud is six or 
seven, depending on the underlying statutory maximum for the crime of con-
viction.97  These numbers are relatively low; on their own, offense levels of 
 
 92. Quick Facts: Theft, Property Destruction, and Fraud Offenses, supra note 
86, at 2. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Bowman, Dead Law Walking, supra note 68, at 1250.  See also Quick Facts: 
Theft, Property Destruction, and Fraud Offenses, supra note 86, at 2 (showing a rise 
in departures over the last five years). 
 95. Bowman, Dead Law Walking, supra note 68, at 1250. 
 96. Mark Allenbaugh, “Drawn from Nowhere”: A Review of the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission’s White-Collar Sentencing Guidelines and Loss Data, 26 FED. SENT’G 
REP. 19, 20–21 n.15 (2013). 
 97. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(a) (U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N 2015).  This feature of Section 2B1.1 – that the base offense level varies 
depending on the statutory maximum of the crime of conviction – is unusual for the 
Guidelines and reflects the breadth of offenses categorized under Section 2B1.1.  See 
id. § 2B1.1. 
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six or seven carry a recommended sentence of zero to six months, with the 
option of probation.98  But low base offense levels are necessary given that 
some crimes sentenced under Section 2B1.1 are relatively minor; the base 
offense level must be calibrated to account for the least serious offense.99  
Therefore, the various specific offense characteristics must do the bulk of the 
work to grade offenders sentenced under Section 2B1.1. 
The Commission decided to use the pecuniary harm associated with an 
economic offense as the primary means by which to differentiate between 
fraud offenders: “The Commission has determined that, ordinarily, the sen-
tences of defendants convicted of federal [economic] offenses should reflect 
the nature and magnitude of the loss caused or intended by their 
crimes. . . .  [Loss] is a principal factor in determining the offense level under 
this Guideline.”100  In short, “[W]hen the original Sentencing Commission 
wrote guidelines for economic crimes, it made the idea of ‘loss’ the linchpin 
of the enterprise.”101  The numbers bear this out.  Whereas the base offense 
level under Section 2B1.1 is six or seven, the median loss enhancement adds 
eight offense levels, and the maximum one adds thirty.102  No other specific 
offense characteristic in the Guidelines is applied more frequently or adds 
more offense levels to fraud sentences than loss.103 
The Commission operationalized the loss calculation by means of a loss 
table.104  The table currently contains fifteen steps, with enhancements rang-
ing from two offense levels (for losses over $6500) to thirty (for losses over 
$550 million), and each step of the table is two offense levels higher than the 
one beneath it.105  The dollar values for each step of the table were raised to 
 
 98. Id. ch. 5, pt. A. 
 99. See id. ch. 2, introductory cmt.; see also id. § 2B1.1. 
 100. Id. § 2B1.1 cmt. background (emphasis added). 
 101. Frank O. Bowman, III, The 2001 Federal Economic Crime Sentencing Re-
forms: An Analysis and Legislative History, 35 IND. L. REV. 5, 25 (2001) [hereinafter 
Bowman, The 2001 Federal Economic Crime Sentencing Reforms]. 
 102. Quick Facts: Theft, Property Destruction, and Fraud Offenses, supra note 
86, at 1 (reporting that the median loss amount in FY 2014 was $118,081).  In FY 
2014, the median loss amount was less than $2000 below the threshold for a ten-level 
enhancement.  Compare id., with U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 
§ 2B1.1(b)(1)(F) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2014) (setting $120,000 as the threshold 
for a ten-level enhancement). 
 103. See Allenbaugh, supra note 96, at 19 (“Under the current Guidelines, loss is 
far and away the primary determinant of the advisory sentencing range under 
§ 2B1.1.”).  Tax offenses are sentenced using a “Tax Table” similar to the loss table 
in Section 2B1.1(b)(1).  See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 2T4.1 (U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N 2015).  The maximum offense level allowable under the Tax Table is thirty-
six, but unlike Section 2B1.1, there is no separate base offense level in the tax Guide-
lines.  See, e.g., id. § 2T1.1(a)(1). 
 104. Id. § 2B1.1(b)(1). 
 105. Id. 
19
Guarnera: A Fatally Flawed Proxy
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2016
734 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
account for inflation for the first time since 2001 as part of the November 
2015 amendments.106 
There are many specific offense characteristics in Section 2B1.1 in addi-
tion to the loss enhancement.  In total, Section 2B1.1 has eighteen subsections 
that provide enhancements, including over twenty-five distinct factual inquir-
ies that can increase a defendant’s sentence.107  Taken individually, however, 
these non-loss enhancements tend to be small – most are just two levels.108  
And although some non-loss enhancements are applied with regularity – such 
as those for crimes involving multiple victims and sophisticated means – 
most are applied infrequently (if at all).109  This is especially true with respect 
to low-loss offenses.  Not a single non-loss enhancement was applied in over 
64% of sentences for crimes where the loss amount was $1 million or less, 
and 88% of such crimes had no more than one enhancement other than 
loss.110  Therefore, despite the high number of non-loss enhancements in Sec-
tion 2B1.1, loss remains the most important sentencing driver in the fraud 
Guidelines.  For that reason, any reform intended to significantly reduce the 
number of downward departures must grapple with the role of loss. 
1.  Historical and Pragmatic Justifications for the Loss Rule 
The Commission’s decision to use loss as the principal rule-based sen-
tencing factor was not unreasonable.  The inaugural Commission conducted 
an empirical review of contemporary federal sentencing practice and deter-
mined that loss was highly correlated with fraud sentences under the indeter-
minate sentencing system.111  The tradition of using loss to grade economic 
 
 106. See Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 80 Fed. Reg. 25782, 
25789 (notice of submission to Congress of amendments May 5, 2015) (announcing 
the inflation adjustment). 
 107. See §§ 2B1.1(b)(2)–(19). 
 108. See id. §§ 2B1.1(b)(2)(A), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8)(A), (9), (10), (11), (12), 
(13)(A), (14), (15), (16)(A), (17), (18). 
 109. See 2013 Symposium on Economic Crime: Application Rates for § 2B1.1, 
Fiscal Year 2012, U.S. SENT’G COMMISSION 2 (2013), 
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-
projects-and-surveys/economic-crimes/20130918-19-
symposium/Application_Rates_FY2012.pdf (showing less than 23% of sentences 
under Section 2B1.1 had a multiple-victims enhancement, and 13% had a sophisticat-
ed-means enhancement). 
 110. See Allenbaugh, supra note 96, at 25 fig. 12.  The 64% and 88% figures were 
calculated by dividing the number of defendants sentenced based on the loss en-
hancement alone (and the loss enhancement plus one other factor) at each relevant 
loss level by the total number of offenders at those levels.  The data are from fiscal 
year 2012.  Id. 
 111. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2F1.1 cmt. background (U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N 1987) (“Empirical analyses of current practices show that the 
most important factors that determine sentence length are the amount of loss and 
whether the offense is an isolated crime of opportunity or is sophisticated or repeated. 
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crimes is much older still.  As early as the Statute of Westminster of 1275, 
thefts were distinguished by the value of the stolen property; the theft of 
property worth over twelve pence – about the cost of a sheep at the time – 
constituted grand larceny (punished by hanging), whereas the theft of proper-
ty worth less than twelve pence was petit larceny (punished by public whip-
ping under the common law, and by seven years of banishment to a colony 
under later English statutes).112  The grand/petit larceny distinction prevailed 
through the American colonial era, and it survives to this day in the many 
state criminal codes that classify property crimes by degrees based on the 
value of the property taken.113 
In addition to its historical lineage, the use of loss had at least three 
pragmatic benefits given the rule-oriented structure of the Guidelines.  First, 
loss offered an objective, quantifiable metric that could in theory be mechani-
cally tallied by any judge tasked with sentencing any fraud offender.114  The 
importance of these characteristics of loss is underscored by the Commis-
sion’s decision to exclude nonpecuniary damages, such as emotional or repu-
tational harms, from the loss calculation because they were too difficult to 
quantify.115  Second, loss allowed the Commission to create as many grades  
Accordingly, although they are imperfect, these are the primary factors upon which 
the guideline has been based.”). 
 112. See Statute of Westminster I, 1275, 3 Edw. 1, ch. 15 (Eng.); see also 4 
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *229, *235–39. 
 113. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 7-104(g) (West 2016) (grading pun-
ishment for theft based on whether the value of the stolen property exceeded $100; 
$1000; $10,000; or $100,000); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.03(e) (West 2016) (grad-
ing punishment for theft based on whether the value of the stolen property exceeded 
$100; $750; $2500; $30,000; $150,000; or $300,000).  Professor Frank Bowman 
hypothesizes that “simplistic” monetary gradations have remained prevalent because 
they “suited the theft cases that predominated in the developing law of England be-
fore very recent times, and that continue to predominate in most American state 
courts.”  See Frank O. Bowman, III, Coping with “Loss”: A Re-Examination of Sen-
tencing Federal Economic Crimes Under the Guidelines, 51 VAND. L. REV. 461, 479 
(1998) [hereinafter Bowman, Coping with “Loss”]. 
 114. These same features favored the use of drug quantity as the basis for drug-
crime sentencing, and, in fact, sentences for drug offenders are based largely on the 
weight of drugs attributable to them. See § 2D1.1(c).  The drug-weight table has also 
been controversial.  See, e.g., Dan Honold, Note, Quantity, Role, and Culpability in 
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 51 HARV. J. LEGIS. 389, 390 (2014) (“The focus 
on quantity [in the drug-weight table] is a problem because quantity is a poor proxy 
for the seriousness of the crime committed.”); see also Johan Bring & Colin Aitken, 
Burden of Proof and Estimation of Drug Quantities Under the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1987, 1998 (1997); Carrie Legus, Quantitative Jus-
tice: Have the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Forsaken Quality?, 21 VT. L. REV. 
1145, 1157 (1997). 
 115. See Bowman, The 2001 Federal Economic Crime Sentencing Reforms, supra 
note 101, at 50 (describing the Commission’s concern that “federal theft and fraud 
sentencings [might turn] into civil damage award hearings, with judges obliged to 
assign monetary values to intangible harms,” and explaining that “[t]he limitation of 
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of punishment as it wanted – every cent could conceivably be assigned its 
own offense level.116  Third, loss was versatile.117  All of the economic crimes 
sentenced under Section 2B1.1 are fundamentally about wrongfully-taken 
property, and thus the measure of the value of that property is a relevant con-
sideration across the broad range of covered offenses.118 
2.  Loss as a Proxy for Culpability and Harm 
Of course, neither loss’s historical lineage nor its pragmatic advantages 
would justify its use in the Guidelines if it bore no rational relationship to the 
purposes of punishment.  The Commission has identified loss as a proxy for 
two critical measures used to craft proportional sentences: “[A]long with 
other relevant factors under the guidelines, loss serves as a measure of [1] the 
seriousness of the offense and [2] the defendant’s relative culpability . . . .”119 
These twin considerations are strikingly similar to those associated with 
one of the most prominent philosophies of punishment: just deserts.  As re-
tributivist scholar Andrew von Hirsh puts it, just-deserts theory is fundamen-
tally concerned with imposing “just” punishments as measured on “two di-
mensions: harm and culpability.  Harm refers to the injury done or risked by 
the act; culpability, to the factors of intent, motive, and circumstance that 
determine the extent to which the offender should be held accountable for the 
act.”120  The Commission itself has defined just deserts similarly – as a func-
 
loss to pecuniary harm . . . was specifically intended to forestall such wide-ranging 
inquiries”). 
 116. See § 2B1.1(b)(1) (assigning an offense-level increase for specific loss 
amounts). 
 117. See, e.g., United States v. Jacobs, 117 F.3d 82, 95 (2d Cir. 1997) (describing 
“loss” as a “flexible, fact-driven concept”). 
 118. There was also a notable lack of obvious alternatives.  See Bowman, Coping 
with “Loss”, supra note 113, at 480–83 (arguing that mens rea, actus reus, the num-
ber of counts, and the attempt/completion distinction were all inhospitable as rule-
based measures for grading fraud offenses). 
 119. § 2B1.1 cmt. background.  While most of the just-deserts literature talks 
about “harm” in place of the Commission’s reference to “offense seriousness,” see 
infra note 120 and accompanying text, the two concepts are similar, if not identical – 
an economic crime is serious because of the harm it causes or risks.  Notably, actual 
loss does not reflect risks unless they were actualized as tangible losses; unrealized 
risks are, however, incorporated in the intended loss calculation.  The willingness to 
impose large risks indicates a heightened degree of culpability, which is the primary 
sentencing factor for which intended loss serves as a rule-oriented proxy. 
 120. Andrew von Hirsch & Nils Jareborg, Gauging Criminal Harm: A Living-
Standard Analysis, in PRINCIPLED SENTENCING 220, 220 (Andrew von Hirsch & An-
drew Ashworth eds., 1992); see also Covey, supra note 15, at 476 (“[T]he primary 
constituents of desert – harm and culpability – are widely agreed upon . . . .”); Aaron 
J. Rappaport, Rationalizing the Commission: The Philosophical Premises of the U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines, 52 EMORY L.J. 557, 568 (2003) (“Among just desert theorists, 
culpability is usually measured along two dimensions: the blameworthiness of the 
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tion of “the offender’s culpability and the resulting harms” – and, in fact, it 
briefly considered using just deserts as the philosophical underpinning for the 
Guidelines as a whole.121  Although the Commission did not expressly invoke 
just-deserts theory to support the central role of harm and culpability in the 
fraud Guidelines, it is not surprising that the Commission drew from a theory 
fundamentally concerned with proportional punishments as it designed the 
provision of Section 2B1.1 with the most significant effect on fraud sentences 
– the loss enhancement.122 
C.  Actual and Intended Loss 
Having identified culpability and offense seriousness (or harm) as the 
two sentencing considerations for which the loss calculation would serve as a 
rule-based proxy, the Commission next needed a definition of loss that would 
reflect these factors and that judges could apply consistently.123  From the 
inaugural Guidelines onward, the Commission has defined “loss” to incorpo-
rate both actual and intended losses.124  The current formulation was promul-
gated in 2001: “[L]oss is the greater of actual or intended loss.”125  Actual  
defendant’s mental state and the harm caused by the conduct.”); David A. Stark-
weather, The Retributive Theory of “Just Deserts” and Victim Participation in Plea 
Bargaining, 67 IND. L.J. 853, 857 (1992) (“The seriousness of a defendant’s conduct 
is expressed as a function of [1] the harm caused by the conduct and [2] the degree of 
a defendant’s responsibility for the crime [i.e., culpability].”); George P. Fletcher, 
What Is Punishment Imposed For?, 5 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 101, 104 (1994) 
(describing Robert Nozick’s formula for determining the appropriate retributive pun-
ishment as the “product of the magnitude of the wrongdoing (H) in relation to the 
degree of culpability (r)”). 
 121. See ch. 1, pt. A(1)(3).  The Commission ultimately declined to adopt any 
overarching philosophy of punishment.  Id. 
 122. The fraud Guidelines would likely look very different if they had been draft-
ed in accord with economically-oriented “crime control” theory – which the Commis-
sion also considered adopting as the basis for the Guidelines – rather than just deserts.  
Id.  For example, they might be designed to account more directly for the risk that an 
individual offender would recidivate and the cost to police of uncovering the crime.  
See Mark A. Cohen, The Economics of Crime and Punishment: Implications for Sen-
tencing of Economic Crimes and New Technology Offenses, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 
503, 513–17 (2000) (describing sentencing strategies designed to minimize the social 
costs of crime). 
 123. See Bowman, Coping with “Loss”, supra note 113, at 498 (“The challenge 
for a drafter of sentencing guidelines is to identify those factors relating to mental 
state that should matter in the imposition of economic crime sentences, and then to 
account for them in the guideline scheme.”). 
 124. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2F1.1 cmt. n.7 (U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N 1987) (“[I]f a probable or intended loss that the defendant was 
attempting to inflict can be determined, that figure would be used if it was larger than 
the actual loss.”). 
 125. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A) (U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N 2015). 
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loss was – and still is – defined as “the reasonably foreseeable pecuniary 
harm that resulted from the offense.”126  Until the November 2015 amend-
ment, intended loss was defined merely as “the pecuniary harm that was in-
tended to result from the offense.”127  The new amendment redefined it as 
“the pecuniary harm that the defendant purposely sought to inflict.”128 
The Commission has justified the use of actual and intended loss by de-
scribing them as proxies for culpability and offense seriousness, respectively: 
The Commission [has] concluded that, for cases in which intended 
loss is greater than actual loss, the intended loss is a more appropriate 
initial measure of the culpability of the offender.  Conversely, in cases 
[in] which the actual loss is greater, that amount is a more appropriate 
measure of the seriousness of the offense.129 
It repeated this theme to explain the 2015 purposeful loss amendment: 
The amendment reflects the Commission’s continued belief that in-
tended loss is an important factor in economic crime offenses, but also 
recognizes that sentencing enhancements predicated on intended loss, 
rather than losses that have actually accrued, should focus more spe-
cifically on the defendant’s culpability.130 
To recast the Commission’s statements in terms of the framework of 
rules and standards, the Commission collapsed the range of facts potentially 
relevant to evaluating harm and culpability into two empirical findings: actual 
and intended loss, respectively.  So long as higher actual losses are associated 
with greater harm and higher intended losses with greater culpability, the 
loss-based proxies will further the Commission’s goal of uniform and pre-
dictable sentences – the traditional benefits associated with rule-based direc-
tives – while also grading defendants proportionally by the harm they im-
posed and their culpability.131  
 126. Id. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A)(i). 
 127. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A)(ii) (U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N 2014). 
 128. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A)(ii) (U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N 2015) (emphasis added). 
 129. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, vol. II (U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N 2003) (explaining the set of amendments effective Nov. 1, 2003) (emphasis 
added); see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, vol. II (U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N 2015) (explaining that intended loss includes losses that could 
not have been realized because “their inclusion better reflects the culpability of the 
offender”) (emphasis added). 
 130. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C supp. (U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N 2015) (emphasis added). 
 131. Id. at ch. 1, pt. A (“[T]he Commission developed these guidelines as a prac-
tical effort toward the achievement of a more honest, uniform, equitable, proportional, 
and therefore effective sentencing system.”). 
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Of course, many defendants who inflict high actual losses will also be 
highly culpable, and many defendants with high intended losses will also 
have risked imposing (or actually imposed) serious harms.132  But actual and 
intended loss nonetheless measure different things, and each one provides a 
distinct data point relevant to sentencing.  For example, consider a ruthless 
con artist with a sophisticated scheme who is arrested before any would-be 
victims make payments.  The actual loss is $0, which accurately reflects the 
absence of victim losses, but not the defendant’s high degree of culpability.  
Conversely, consider a developer who lies to qualify for a loan but is confi-
dent that her collateral would cover any default.  An unexpected (but not en-
tirely unforeseeable) market downturn makes her collateral worthless, and 
later she defaults.  Here, the defendant’s culpability is relatively low, but her 
actual loss is the full amount of her loan – the same as someone who simply 
stole the same sum of money.  Actual and intended loss often point in the 
same direction, but they do not always do so. 
By measuring harm and culpability predominantly with respect to actual 
and intended loss, the rules in the fraud Guidelines are based on generaliza-
tions that necessarily fail to capture the full range of facts that might be rele-
vant to evaluating harm and culpability in any given case.  The degree to 
which this under-inclusiveness is problematic will depend on the correlation 
between the empirical triggers and the principles that they proxy.  If the rela-
tionship between them is weak, the rule-maker can either identify a better 
empirical trigger or, if the costs of doing so ex ante are prohibitive, delegate 
authority to officials on the ground to evaluate the facts in light of the rele-
vant policy objectives – i.e., the rule could be converted into a standard. 
The relationship between actual loss and the harm from an offense is 
fairly straightforward.  As a general matter, the greater the loss, the more 
social harm results.  Actual loss is certainly not a perfect proxy for offense 
seriousness; for example, a crime that causes each of ten retirees to lose 
$100,000 might be more serious (to society and the victims) than one that 
causes each of 100,000 wealthy investors to lose $10.  Additionally, the loss 
calculation excludes nonpecuniary harms such as emotional or reputational 
injuries entirely, even though they can significantly affect the harmfulness of 
an offense.133  But although actual loss is a simplified measure of harm, the 
connection between actual losses and harm is clear and intuitive. 
It is much less apparent whether intended loss is an adequate proxy for 
the range of facts that bear on a defendant’s culpability.  “Culpability” has 
two common definitions in criminal law: it can be either the mental state re- 
 132. See Bowman, The 2001 Federal Economic Crime Sentencing Reforms, supra 
note 101, at 40 (“[A]ctual loss is not only a direct measure of harm, but also an im-
portant proxy measurement of mens rea.  Similarly, intended loss serves as a direct 
measurement of mental state, but also as a rough measure of the risk of real harm 
presented by the defendant’s conduct.”). 
 133. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A)(iii) (explaining that “loss” under the fraud Guidelines 
“does not include emotional distress, harm to reputation, or other non-economic 
harm”). 
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quired to hold a defendant liable for a crime (i.e., the mens rea element of an 
offense), or, more generally, it can mean “[m]oral blameworthiness.”134  
Since guilt has already been established by the time of sentencing, it is this 
second definition – the “moral blameworthiness” of one defendant relative to 
others – that the intended loss calculation must capture.135 
What makes one defendant more morally blameworthy than another?  
This question is complex, and the Commission has not endeavored to define 
culpability’s scope.136  Numerous factors are potentially relevant in the con-
text of fraud sentencing.  These might include, but are certainly not limited 
to, the defendant’s motive; the defendant’s role in the scheme; whether the 
defendant abused a position of trust; the duration of the offense; the defend-
ant’s efforts to mitigate the harms from his crime; the defendant’s contrition; 
whether the defendant voluntary ceased the offense; the defendant’s aware-
ness of the harms likely to be inflicted by the offense; the nonpecuniary 
harms that the defendant intended to inflict; and the pecuniary harm that the 
defendant intended to inflict.137 
 
 134. Culpability, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); see also Michael S. 
Moore, Prima Facie Moral Culpability, 76 B.U. L. REV. 319, 320 (1996) (“[O]ne is 
culpable if he chooses to do wrong in circumstances when that choice is freely 
made.”); John Shepherd Wiley Jr., Not Guilty by Reason of Blamelessness: Culpabil-
ity in Federal Criminal Interpretation, 85 VA. L. REV. 1021, 1026 (1999) (“Conven-
tional moral theory in contemporary America holds that people deserve moral blame 
when they have had a fair chance to obey the law but have failed to do so.”); Stephen 
P. Garvey, “As the Gentle Rain from Heaven”: Mercy in Capital Sentencing, 81 
CORNELL L. REV. 989, 1023–24 (1996) (arguing that the Supreme Court has implicit-
ly recognized two theories of moral culpability in capital sentencing, one focusing on 
whether a defendant acted on his own free will and the other on whether the offense 
was the result of a defective or evil character). 
 135. A defendant’s mental state is widely recognized as relevant to sentencing; as 
Judge Jack Weinstein has written, “[O]ne cannot imagine, except in Alice’s Wonder-
land . . . a system in which mens rea is relevant to conviction, but not to sentencing – 
without imagining an institutionalized miscarriage of justice.”  Jack B. Weinstein & 
Fred A. Bernstein, The Denigration of Mens Rea in Drug Sentencing, 7 FED. SENT’G 
REP. 121, 122 (1994).  Unfortunately, the Guidelines’ approach to classifying mental 
states mirrors that of the federal criminal code generally, which uses a hodgepodge of 
about eighty distinct terms for mental states, almost all of them undefined.  See PAUL 
H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW § 4.1, at 212 n.17 (1997) (calculating seventy-eight 
mens rea terms in federal law). 
 136. The Guidelines expressly cabin the culpability inquiry in several ways as a 
matter of policy.  For example, a defendant’s education and vocational skills, drug 
dependence, family ties and responsibilities, prior history of good works, and lack of 
guidance as a youth are all considered either absolutely or presumptively irrelevant in 
determining whether a departure is warranted.  See §§ 5H1.2, 5H1.4, 5H1.6, 5H1.11, 
5H1.12. 
 137. See Samuel W. Buell, Culpability and Modern Crime, 103 GEO. L.J. 547, 
553–54 (2015) (arguing that fraud, along with certain other crimes, contains “offense 
features – conceptual foundations that are defined according to social context, em-
beddedness, focus on matters of psychology and autonomy, and fast norm evolution – 
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Intended loss, by its terms, only incorporates this last factor.  Whether 
the virtues of a given rule for grading defendants by their moral blamewor-
thiness outweigh the vices of the rule’s under-inclusiveness turns on both the 
way intended loss is defined and the next-best alternatives.  Those two topics 
will occupy the remainder of this Article.  In order to evaluate them, however, 
it is important to consider two additional features of the way that intended 
loss functions in the fraud Guidelines. 
1.  The Absence of Mitigation in the Fraud Guidelines 
One important structural feature of intended loss in Section 2B1.1 stems 
from the definition of loss itself: “[L]oss is the greater of actual loss or in-
tended loss.”138  This definition allows for three possible scenarios: actual and 
intended loss can be the same (in which case it does not matter which meas-
ure is used); actual loss can be greater; or intended loss can be greater.  But 
whichever scenario applies, the loss enhancement is based exclusively on 
either actual or intended loss, and the alternative measure has no effect on the 
final sentence. 
As an initial matter, it is noteworthy that the equal weight given by the 
Commission to actual and intended loss is a departure from its typical ap-
proach to incomplete criminal conduct.  Some criminal law theorists (notably 
the drafters of the Model Penal Code (“MPC”))139 contend that only inten-
tions should matter in determining proportional punishments, and therefore 
defendants should not benefit from their failure to inflict their intended 
harms.140  This is the view implicitly adopted in the fraud Guidelines.  If de-
fendants intended a large loss, the “moral luck” that led them to inflict less 
harm than they intended does not translate into a sentencing reduction; in-
stead, the loss enhancement is the same as it would have been if they had 
successfully completed the crime.141  This is not the normal philosophy of the 
Guidelines, however.  For example, the Commission has taken the position 
that, as a principle, “harm that is merely risked is not to be treated as the 
equivalent of harm that occurred,”142 and criminal attempts are sentenced 
three offense levels below the level prescribed for the same completed of-
 
[that] make the criminal law’s standard task of examining culpability especially diffi-
cult”). 
 138. § 2B1.1 cmt. 3(A) (emphasis added). 
 139. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.05(1) (AM. LAW. INST., Proposed Official Draft, 
1962). 
 140. See, e.g., LARRY ALEXANDER & KIMBERLY KESSLER FERZAN, CRIME AND 
CULPABILITY: A THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW 172–73 (2009). 
 141. See id. at 172.  See also app. C., vol. II (“The Commission concluded that, 
for cases in which intended loss is greater than actual loss, the intended loss is a more 
appropriate initial measure of the culpability of the offender.”). 
 142. See § 1B1.3 cmt n.6(B) (“Unless clearly indicated by the guidelines, harm 
that is merely risked is not to be treated as the equivalent of harm that occurred.”). 
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fense.143  The Commission has never explained why it believes that incom-
plete attempts should receive a sentencing discount but incomplete losses 
should not. 
There is a more fundamental concern with the “greater of” formulation, 
however.  The Commission has indicated that, consistent with just-deserts 
theory, culpability and harm are both relevant to fraud sentencing.144  But 
since loss is defined such that only actual or intended loss can be the basis for 
the loss enhancement, only the loss proxy designed primarily for the purpose 
of reflecting harm or culpability is ever actually reflected in the Guidelines 
calculation – never both. 
Furthermore, the choice between actual and intended loss is not random: 
the greater number applies every time, meaning that the most punitive meas-
ure is used regardless of what the lesser number might indicate about the of-
fense.  In other words, the Guidelines abandon any effort to holistically rec-
oncile measures of harm and culpability.  If a defendant had a grandiose plan 
to steal $10 million, but the scheme was ludicrously unlikely to succeed, then 
the defendant would be highly culpable but would have imposed relatively 
little real-world harm or even risk of harm.145  A just-deserts analysis might 
conclude that such a defendant should be punished less harshly than a savvier 
fraudfeasor who had successfully carried out a $10 million crime.  Yet in 
both cases, the fraud Guidelines would add the full enhancement associated 
with a $10 million loss in the loss table.146 
If harm and culpability are independent variables relevant to proportion-
al sentencing, then the greater-of-actual-or-intended-loss formulation ob-
scures potentially relevant information.  One way to incorporate both data 
points into the Guidelines calculation would be to simply average actual and 
 
 143. Id. § 2X1.1(b)(1). 
 144. See id. § 2B1.1 cmt. background (explaining that “loss serves as a measure of 
the seriousness of the offense and the defendant’s relative culpability”) (emphasis 
added); see also Paul J. Hofer & Mark H. Allenbaugh, The Reason Behind the Rules: 
Finding and Using the Philosophy of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 40 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 19, 24 (2003) (“The seriousness of an offense depends on both (1) the 
harm it causes, and (2) the offender’s personal culpability for that harm.”); Alon 
Harel & Gideon Parchomovsky, On Hate and Equality, 109 YALE L.J. 507, 508 
(1999) (arguing that the “wrongfulness-culpability hypothesis” – which maintains 
“that the only two grounds that may justify disparate treatment of offenses in the 
context of criminal law are the wrongfulness of the act or the culpability of the perpe-
trator” – dominates the contemporary discourse on punishment); sources cited supra 
note 120. 
 145. See, e.g., United States v. Corsey, 723 F.3d 366, 378–79 (2d Cir. 2013) (Un-
derhill, J., concurring) (arguing that a sentence based on a $3 billion intended loss 
was substantively unreasonable because “[it] was a clumsy, almost comical, conspira-
cy” that “could be more accurately described as a comedic plot outline for a ‘Three 
Stooges’ episode” and thus posed no real risk of harm). 
 146. See § 2B1.1. 
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intended loss.147  Alternatively, actual and intended loss could be weighted 
differently but combined to create one comprehensive loss calculation.  These 
proposals would ensure that every loss calculation reflected both culpability 
and harm – as measured by the intended and actual loss – and that a low level 
of either would reduce the overall loss amount, and thus the resulting en-
hancement.  Such an approach would not be significantly more burdensome 
for judges than the current system, which already de facto requires them to 
estimate both actual and intended loss to determine which is greater.  It would 
also necessarily drive down loss calculations on average, which would reduce 
the average length of sentences and, in turn, the rate of below-Guidelines 
departures. 
2.  Non-Loss Enhancements and Double Counting 
Because actual and intended loss are designed to measure different 
(though often correlated) things – harm and culpability – they both add 
unique and relevant information to the sentencing calculus.  But Section 
2B1.1 has many sentencing enhancements unrelated to loss that also reflect 
harm and culpability yet are added cumulatively to the loss enhancement.  
The original fraud and theft Guidelines only had five non-loss-related en-
hancements.148  They have proliferated over time, however, and there are now 
eighteen.149  For example, offense levels are added if the defendant misrepre-
sented him- or herself as a representative of a charitable or religious organiza-
tion,150 was in the business of receiving stolen property,151 threatened the 
solvency of a bank,152 or injured more than ten victims.153  And in addition to 
these enhancements unique to Section 2B1.1, there are others that apply 
across the entire Guidelines, such as if a victim is particularly vulnerable154 or  
 147. See James Gibson, How Much Should Mind Matter? Mens Rea in Theft and 
Fraud Sentencing, 10 FED. SENT’G REP. 136, 138 (1997) (proposing that intended and 
actual loss should be averaged). 
 148. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 2F1.1(2)–(3) (U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N 1987) (prescribing enhancements for offenses involving more than minimal 
planning, more than one victim, misrepresentation by the defendant that he was acting 
on behalf of a charitable organization, the violation of a court order, or the use of a 
foreign bank account).  Fraud and theft were punished under separate Guidelines’ 
provisions until 2001, and the original theft Guideline also had five non-loss en-
hancements.  See id. §§ 2B1.1(b)(2)–(6) (prescribing enhancements for offenses in-
volving a firearm, theft from the person of another, more than minimal planning, 
undelivered mail, or organized crime). 
 149. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 2B1.1(b)(2)–(19) (U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N 2015).  There are about twenty-five distinct factual inquiries 
associated with the eighteen non-loss enhancements.  Id. 
 150. Id. § 2B1.1(b)(9). 
 151. Id. § 2B1.1(b)(4). 
 152. Id. § 2B1.1(b)(16)(B). 
 153. Id. § 2B1.1(b)(2). 
 154. Id. § 3A1.1(b). 
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if the offender abused a position of trust.155  The wide array of available en-
hancements has led some to compare them to the decorations adorning “a 
Christmas tree or a Chanukah bush.”156 
The “factor creep” in Section 2B1.1 is partially a function of the per-
ceived inadequacy of the loss calculation rule to fully reflect culpability and 
harm, as well as the political incentives for Congress and the Commission to 
add politically popular specific offense characteristics.157  The upshot is that, 
whereas at first loss served as a holistic catch-all proxy for harm and culpabil-
ity, it now exists alongside a parallel system of numerous detailed enhance-
ments that also reflect aspects of harm and culpability.  This is a recipe for 
double-counting.  The risk is especially acute for high-loss crimes that, by 
nature, almost always trigger multiple non-loss enhancements, such as those 
for large numbers of victims158 and sophisticated schemes.159  When these 
extra offense levels are added to the already-high loss enhancement, the 
Guidelines can easily recommend life in prison.160 
The double-counting problem caused by non-loss enhancements could 
be mitigated.  For example, some of the non-loss enhancements could be 
eliminated, the number of offense levels associated with them could be re-
duced, and caps could be placed on the total number of offense levels that can 
be added to a final sentence.161  Another salutary reform would be to create 
mitigating special offense characteristics that subtract offense levels.  Cur-
rently, not a single specific offense characteristic in Section 2B1.1 reduces 
the number of offense levels; like the greater-of-actual-or-intended-loss for-
mulation, the non-loss enhancements function exclusively to push sentences 
higher.  New Guidelines provisions instructing judges to reduce the final of-
fense level by two if the defendant voluntarily ceased the offense or took 
concrete steps to limit victim losses would (ironically) help counteract the  
 155. Id. § 3B1.1. 
 156. Saris, Keynote Address on the Administration of Criminal Law, supra note 6 
(“Some have called [Section 2B1.1] a Christmas tree or a Chanukah bush.  As a re-
sult, the Commission has heard criticism of the [G]uideline that the specific offense 
characteristics lead to a ‘piling on’ for many defendants, particularly at high loss 
amounts.”). 
 157. See, e.g., Frank O. Bowman, III, Pour Encourager Les Autres? The Curious 
History and Distressing Implications of the Criminal Provisions of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act and the Sentencing Guidelines Amendments that Followed, 1 OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 373, 405–07 (2004) [hereinafter Bowman, Pour Encourager Les Autres?] 
(describing the specific offense characteristics that Congress ordered the Commission 
to implement as part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act). 
 158. § 2B1.1(b)(2). 
 159. Id. § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C). 
 160. This effect would be even more pronounced if non-loss enhancements were 
not routinely plea-bargained away.  See Bowman, Comment on Proposed Amend-
ments to Economic Crime Guideline, supra note 57, at 8–10. 
 161. Frank O. Bowman, III, Damp Squib: The Disappointing Denouement of the 
Sentencing Commission’s Economic Crime Project (and What They Should Do Now), 
27 FED. SENT’G REP. 270, 276 (2015) [hereinafter Bowman, Damp Squib]. 
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effects of factor creep, especially for relatively low-harm and low-culpability 
defendants. 
While these reforms to the greater-of-actual-or-intended-loss formula-
tion and non-loss enhancements would be beneficial, they would not address 
the issues that arise from the inherent under-inclusiveness of intended loss as 
a proxy for the complex and multifaceted concept of culpability.  We turn to 
that issue now. 
 
IV.  THE CHALLENGE OF MEASURING CULPABILITY WITH A RULE:  
THE 2015 “PURPOSEFUL LOSS” AMENDMENT 
Even though “[t]he meaning of the word ‘intent’ in the criminal law has 
always been rather obscure,”162 the inaugural fraud Guidelines did not define 
intended loss at all.163  In 2001, the Commission amended Section 2B1.1 to 
define intended loss as “the pecuniary harm that was intended to result from 
the offense,”164 including “intended pecuniary harm that would have been 
impossible or unlikely to occur.”165  As one court noted, to define intended 
loss as the loss that was intended to result from the crime was “seriously cir-
cular.”166  Yet this fairly flimsy definition remained operative until the No-
vember 2015 amendment sought to clarify just what makes a loss “intended.” 
A.  Clarifying the Meaning of “Intended” Loss 
According to the Commission, the impetus for the November 2015 
amendment was the fact that “courts have expressed some disagreement as to 
whether a subjective or an objective inquiry is required” when calculating 
intended loss.167  The “objective” approach was most consistently applied in 
the First Circuit, which held: 
 
 162. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 5.2 (5th ed. 2010). 
 163. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2F1.1(b)(1) (U.S SENTENCING 
COMM’N 1987); see also § 2F1.1 cmt. n.7 (offering examples of intended loss); 
§ 2F1.1 cmt n.8 (explaining that the amount of loss need not be calculated with preci-
sion). 
 164. U.S SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A)(ii)(I) (U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N 2014).  The 2001 amendments were themselves designed to 
resolve circuit splits regarding the loss calculation.  See Bowman, Coping With 
“Loss”, supra note 113, at 464 n.3 (listing various circuit splits prior to the 2001 
amendments). 
 165. Id. § 2B1.1 n.3(A)(ii)(II). 
 166. United States v. Manatau, 647 F.3d 1048, 1050 (10th Cir. 2011). 
 167. Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 80 Fed. Reg. 25782, 25791 
(notice of submission to Congress of amendments May 5, 2015).  Some commenta-
tors have described the split as a disagreement over whether constructive intent was 
adequate to establish the loss amount, or whether actual intent was required.  See 
Gabrielle A. Bernstein, Comment, The Role of Expectations in Assessing Intended 
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[I]ntended loss . . . is a term of art meaning the loss the defendant rea-
sonably expected to occur at the time he perpetrated the 
fraud. . . . [W]e focus our loss inquiry for purposes of determining a 
defendant’s offense level on the objectively reasonable expectation of 
a person in his position at the time he perpetrated the fraud, not on his 
subjective intentions or hopes.168 
In other words, “Intended loss is the loss that a person standing in the 
defendant’s shoes reasonably would have expected to cause at the time he 
perpetrated the fraud.”169  The First Circuit has forthrightly explained that 
“expected [loss] would be a better term” for its approach.170  Although other 
courts of appeals have not applied the objective expectations definition as 
consistently as the First Circuit, they have at times inserted an objective di-
mension into their intended loss analysis.  For example, the Seventh Circuit 
has held that “[t]he determination of intended loss . . . focuses on the conduct 
of the defendant and the objective financial risk to victims caused by that 
conduct,”171 and it has expressly rejected the argument that this approach 
“fails to account for the defendant’s subjective intent.”172 
The majority of appellate courts, however, have “characterized intended 
loss with reference to a defendant’s actual, subjective intent.”173  The subjec- 
Loss in Mortgage-Fraud Schemes, 2010 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 337, 342 (2010) (arguing 
that the “objectivist” position should be understood in terms of constructive intent).  
Indeed, some courts have described the issue in those terms as well.  See, e.g., United 
States v. Conroy, 567 F.3d 174, 179 (5th Cir. 2009) (“When determining an intended 
loss, the district court must rely on actual, not constructive, intent.”); United States v. 
Morrow, 177 F.3d 272, 301 (5th Cir. 1999) (“We look to actual, not constructive, 
intent . . . .”). 
 168. United States v. Innarelli, 524 F.3d 286, 290–91 (1st Cir. 2008) (emphasis 
added). 
 169. United States v. Iwuala, 789 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2015). 
 170. United States v. McCoy, 508 F.3d 74, 79 (1st Cir. 2007).  Even though its 
intended loss inquiry “focuses primarily on the offender’s objectively reasonable 
expectations,” the First Circuit has acknowledged that “subjective intent may play 
some role,” though it has not explained what this would be.  United States v. Alphas, 
785 F.3d 775, 780 (1st Cir. 2015); see also Innarelli, 524 F.3d at 291 (noting that the 
First Circuit had “suggest[ed] in passing that a subjective component may play some 
role in the intended-loss inquiry”) (citing McCoy, 508 F.3d at 79). 
 171. United States v. Lane, 323 F.3d 568, 590 (7th Cir. 2003) (emphasis omitted 
and emphasis added).  Note that Lane advocates for an assessment of the financial 
risk that was actually imposed by the offense, not merely the risk that an objectively 
reasonable person in the defendant’s position would have recognized (as required in 
the First Circuit).  Compare id., with Alphas, 785 F.3d at 780.  At other times, the 
Seventh Circuit has stressed that intended loss is a subjective inquiry.  See, e.g., Unit-
ed States v. Middlebrook, 553 F.3d 572, 578 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he true measure of 
intended loss [is] in the mind of the defendant . . . .”). 
 172. United States v. Durham, 766 F.3d 672, 687 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 173. United States v. Hartstein, 500 F.3d 790, 798 (8th Cir. 2007); see also United 
States v. Diallo, 710 F.3d 147, 151 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[W]e look to the ‘defendant’s 
32
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 81, Iss. 3 [2016], Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol81/iss3/6
2016] A FATALLY FLAWED PROXY 747 
tive standard does not require judges to be mind readers, of course, and there 
is often good reason to infer that defendants intended the probable conse-
quences of their actions.174  In effect, the difference between the subjective 
and objective approaches is that the former posits that a reasonable person’s 
expectations are evidence of a defendant’s intent, whereas the latter holds that 
they independently satisfy the intent inquiry. 
Given that the Commission had framed the circuit split as one between a 
subjective and objective approach to defining intent, the November 2015 
amendment redefining intended loss as the pecuniary harm that the defendant 
purposely sought to inflict is surprising.175  The Commission could have en-
dorsed the majority position by adding a single word to the current definition: 
“‘Intended loss’ means the pecuniary harm that was [subjectively] intended to 
result from the offense.”  To be sure, the Commission’s use of the word “pur-
pose” also serves as a clear rejection of the objectivists’ position.  But be-
cause “purpose” has a technical and narrowly drawn definition in criminal 
law, the amendment could be interpreted to have significantly changed the 
scope of intended loss.176 
The key language in the new amendment – “purposely sought to inflict” 
– comes directly from a 2011 Tenth Circuit opinion, United States v. Mana-
tau,177 and the Commission expressly stated that “[t]he amendment adopts the 
approach taken by the Tenth Circuit” in that case.178  The defendant in Mana-
tau had pleaded guilty to stealing two convenience checks with a credit limit 
over $10,000.179  He had no way of knowing the credit limit, however, and 
had already cashed the checks for $1840 when he was arrested.180  Neverthe-
less, the district court held that the defendant’s intended loss was $10,000, 
effectively adopting an objective measure based on the loss that was “possi-
ble and potentially contemplated by the defendant’s scheme.”181 
Writing for the Tenth Circuit, Judge Gorsuch rejected the district court’s 
objective inquiry into intended loss and remanded the case for resentenc-
ing.182  The court reasoned that the actual-loss provision in Section 2B2.1 
would be surplusage if intended loss included losses that would have been 
 
subjective expectation, not to the risk of loss to which he may have exposed his vic-
tims.’”) (quoting United States v. Yeaman, 194 F.3d 442, 469 (3d Cir. 1999)); United 
States v. Confredo, 528 F.3d 143, 152 (2d Cir. 2008) (endorsing the subjective meas-
urement of intended loss). 
 174. See Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 154 (2004) (“[I]ntent is always 
determined by objective means.”). 
 175. Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 80 Fed. Reg. 25782, 25790 
(notice of submission to Congress of amendments May 5, 2015). 
 176. Id. 
 177. 647 F.3d 1048, 1050 (10th Cir. 2011) (emphasis omitted). 
 178. 80 Fed. Reg. at 25791. 
 179. Manatau, 647 F.3d at 1049. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. at 1057. 
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reasonably (i.e., objectively) foreseeable in light of the scheme, but that the 
defendant did not subjectively intend.183  This is so because actual loss is 
defined to equal only those losses that actually occurred and were reasonably 
foreseeable.184  If all reasonably foreseeable losses were by definition intend-
ed losses, then the intended loss would always be at least as high as the actual 
loss.185  Thus, in order to prevent the actual loss measure from being redun-
dant, intended loss should not be interpreted to incorporate an objective fore-
seeability test.186  The Tenth Circuit concluded that “whatever the term ‘in-
tent’ might mean, we have never heard of a definition that would allow us to 
say that an individual’s intentions include things he never [subjectively] con-
templated – except perhaps in an Opposite Day game.”187  Apart from the 
surplusage argument, however, the Tenth Circuit did not discuss the subjec-
tive/objective split in any detail; in fact, it downplayed objectivist precedent 
from the First and Seventh Circuits.188 
Instead, the bulk of the Manatau opinion was devoted to defending 
“purpose” as the proper meaning of “intent.”189  The Tenth Circuit drew its 
definition of “purpose” directly from the MPC.190  One of the MPC’s primary 
innovations was to replace the hodgepodge of mental states that had accumu-
lated in the common law and statutes with a crisply defined four-level hierar-
chy – purpose, knowledge, recklessness, and criminal negligence – that has 
become “the predominant ‘American’ system of culpability distinctions.”191  
 
 183. Id. at 1053. 
 184. See id.  In practice, courts almost never find that a realized loss was so un-
foreseeable as to be excluded from the actual loss calculation.  See, e.g., United States 
v. Turk, 626 F.3d 743, 750 (2d Cir. 2010) (rejecting the argument that a defendant’s 
actual losses were unforeseeable because of the nationwide subprime mortgage crisis 
of the late 2000s). 
 185. Manatau, 647 F.3d at 1053. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. (emphasis omitted).  The Tenth Circuit could probably have vacated 
Manatau’s sentence based on this observation alone.  See id.  Manatau’s act of cash-
ing the convenience checks for far less than their maximum possible value is almost 
decisive evidence that he did not subjectively intend to cause the maximum possible 
loss. 
 188. Id. at 1055 (finding that United States v. McCoy stood merely for the propo-
sition that “judges can and often must reach conclusions about a defendant’s mens rea 
based on inferences from known facts about his conduct,” and “any suggestion about 
a possibly lower mens rea standard in [United States v. Mei, 315 F.3d 788, 793 (7th 
Cir. 2003)] is no more than dicta”) (citations omitted). 
 189. See generally id. 
 190. Id. at 1050–51. 
 191. Paul H. Robinson, A Brief History of Distinctions in Criminal Culpability, 31 
HASTINGS L.J. 815, 816 (1980).  The influence of the MPC goes far beyond the juris-
dictions that have formally adopted the MPC’s mental-states hierarchy in whole or in 
part.  For example, just last year eight Supreme Court Justices assumed that it was 
their duty to choose which of the MPC mental states should apply to a statute that was 
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The MPC influences the Guidelines themselves in several places,192 and nu-
merous courts have used the MPC to interpret the “ordinary, contemporary, 
[and] common meaning” of terms in the Guidelines.193 
Under the MPC, a person purposely causes a result (such as the inflic-
tion of a pecuniary loss) if “it is his conscious object to . . . cause such a re-
sult.”194  The empirical risk that harm will result from the defendant’s con-
duct is not relevant to the purposefulness inquiry.  Rather, “The purposeful 
act is purely desire-based.  An actor acts purposefully if he desires the very 
result caused by his wrong.”195  The MPC itself very rarely conditions crimi-
nal liability on a showing of purpose, reserving it for crimes such as attempt, 
conspiracy, burglary, and treason.196 
Comparing purpose to its adjacent mental state of knowledge shows 
why it is used so sparingly.  A defendant acts with knowledge if he is “aware 
that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause” a specific result.197  
 
silent as to mens rea.  See Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2011 (2015); id. at 
2014 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 192. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.4(a)(3) (U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N 2015) (using the “intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly” hier-
archy). 
 193. Manatau, 647 F.3d at 1050 (quoting United States v. Lopez-DeLeon, 513 
F.3d 472, 474 (5th Cir. 2008)); see also United States v. Borer, 412 F.3d 987, 992 
(8th Cir. 2005); United States v. Honeycutt, 8 F.3d 785, 787 (11th Cir. 1993).  As a 
general matter, the MPC’s method – “resolve as many issues as possible with legisla-
tive text, leaving little room for judicial lawmaking” – shifted decision-making power 
from judges to legislatures, much as the transition from indeterminate sentencing to 
guidelines-sentencing did.  WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 267 (2011). 
 194. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a)(i) (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Official Draft 
1962) (emphasis added). 
 195. Francis X. Shen et al., Sorting Guilty Minds, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1306, 1317 
(2011); see also SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW 
AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 209 (2001) (“[A]ction is not purposive 
with respect to the nature or result of the actor’s conduct unless it was his conscious 
object to perform an action of that nature or to cause such a result.  It is meaningful to 
think of the actor’s attitude as different if he is simply aware that his conduct is of the 
required nature or that the prohibited result is practically certain to follow from his 
conduct,” which would fall under the MPC definition of “knowledge.”). 
 196. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(a) (explaining that a person is guilty of attempt 
if he or she “purposely engages in conduct which would constitute the crime if the 
attendant circumstances were as he believes them to be”); id. § 5.03 (defining con-
spiracy as an agreement to commit a crime entered into “with the purpose of promot-
ing or facilitating its commission”); id. § 221.1 (defining burglary as the entry into a 
building “with [the] purpose to commit a crime therein”).  See also MODEL PENAL 
CODE § 2.02 cmt. at 125 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955) (stating that treason requires a 
“purpose to aid the enemy”).  “Theft by deception” – the MPC analog to fraud – also 
requires that the defendant have the purpose of obtaining property of another by de-
ception.  § 223.3 (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
 197. § 2.02(2)(b)(ii) (emphasis added). 
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As Manatau explained, quoting from the MPC commentaries, the difference 
between purpose and knowledge is that “between a man who wills that a par-
ticular act or result take place and another who is merely willing that it should 
take place.”198  For example, it is the difference “between a farm boy [who] 
clears the ground for setting up a still . . . in order to work a still” and some-
one who does so “knowing that the venture is illicit but just looking for a pay-
ing day’s work.”199  Other hypotheticals demonstrate just how narrow the 
MPC definition of purpose is: a person who plants a bomb on a plane because 
she desires to kill the pilot has only purposely killed one person, even though 
it was “practically certain” that all passengers would die.200 
Manatau used a variety of tools of statutory construction to conclude 
that Section 2B1.1’s use of “intent” should be interpreted as purpose, not 
knowledge.  The court looked to Supreme Court precedent;201 the definition 
of “intent” in popular dictionaries;202 Guidelines provisions that appear to 
distinguish between intent and knowledge;203 background legal norms regard-
 
 198. United States v. Manatau, 647 F.3d 1048, 1051 (10th Cir. 2011) (quoting 
MPC § 2.02 cmt. 2 at 233 n.6). 
 199. § 2.06 cmt. 6(c) (emphasis added). 
 200. See Claire Finkelstein, The Inefficiency of Mens Rea, 88 CAL. L. REV. 895, 
906–07 (2000) (using the same hypothetical); see also David Crump, What Does 
Intent Mean?, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1059, 1062 (2010) (“‘Conscious desire’ creates a 
particularly narrow definition of intent.  To see how narrow, imagine a defendant who 
says, ‘Yes, I killed this man, but I didn’t really intend to.  I knew that what I did was 
going to result in his death, but I just didn’t care whether he died or not.’  Technically, 
this state of mind is not sufficient for a finding of MPC-type intent [i.e., purpose].  
Surprisingly, the actor’s indifference means that the ‘conscious desire’ that is the 
essence of this state of mind is missing.”); Jay Sterling Silver, Intent Reconceived, 
101 IOWA L. REV. 371, 390–91 (2015) (describing the definition of purpose adopted 
in the MPC as “connot[ing] an aspirational state of mind,” while arguing that this 
definition is ill-conceived). 
 201. See Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 368 (2008) (noting that the “claim that 
knowledge is sufficient to show intent is emphatically not the modern view”) (citing 1 
WAYNE LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 5.2 (2d ed. 2003)). 
 202. See WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 629 (1985) (defining 
“intend” as “to have something in your mind as a purpose or goal”). 
 203. Manatau, 647 F.3d at 1052 (“All these [Guidelines] provisions again stand in 
sharp contrast to the definition of ‘intended loss,’ which makes no mention of a 
knowledge standard.  And all would be a nonsense if the term ‘intent’ already encom-
passed ‘knowledge.’”).  See also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 
2B1.1(b)(13)(B) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2015) (“If the offense involved misap-
propriation of a trade secret and the defendant knew or intended that the offense 
would benefit a foreign government . . . .”) (emphasis added); id. § 5K2.1 (noting the 
mens rea as “intended or knowingly risked”); id. § 5K2.2 (noting the mens rea as 
“intended or knowingly risked”); id. § 5K2.3 (noting the mens rea as “intended or 
knowingly risked”); id. § 8C4.2 (noting the mens rea as “intended or knowingly 
risked”); id. § 1A1.4(f) (noting the mens rea as “knowledge or intent”); id. § 2K2.1(c) 
(noting the mens rea as “knowledge or intent”); id. § 2K2.5(c) (noting the mens rea as 
“knowledge or intent”); id. § 2K1.3(b)(3) (noting the mens rea as “knowledge, intent, 
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ing the mens rea required for inchoate crimes like attempt and conspiracy;204 
and the rule of lenity.205  The Tenth Circuit concluded that “[t]he Model Pe-
nal Code reflects th[e] contemporary understanding,” and “in contemporary 
usage,” the meaning of intent is “pretty plain”: “Something is intended if it is 
done on purpose – not merely known, foreseen, or just possible or potentially 
contemplated.”206 
Because its analysis relied on tools of statutory interpretation, Manatau 
has little bearing on whether intent-as-purpose is optimal sentencing policy.  
Unlike the Tenth Circuit, the Commission was not bound by the extant text 
when issuing the November 2015 amendment; it was free to choose whatever 
rule best enabled “intended loss . . . [to] focus more specifically on the de-
fendant’s culpability.”207  By framing the problem to be solved as the subjec-
tive/objective circuit split, and then adopting Manatau’s conclusion that “in-
tent” should mean “purpose,” the Commission glossed over whether purpose 
was in fact the best proxy for culpability in fraud sentencing.  It also failed to 
mention a highly pertinent fact: before Manatau, not a single court had ever 
interpreted intended loss to require “purpose” as defined in the MPC.208 
B.  Critiquing the Fit Between Purposeful Loss and Culpability 
Because intended loss is defined as the “pecuniary harm that the de-
fendant purposely sought to inflict,” it is the pecuniary harm – not the fraudu-
lent or larcenous behavior itself – that must be purposed.209  A defendant who 
purposely imposes a loss is certainly blameworthy, and all things being equal, 
it is more blameworthy to impose a large loss than a small one.  But the pur-
poseful loss amendment does not simply say that purposely inflicted losses 
are culpable, or that they are more culpable than less-than-purposeful losses.  
Instead, it says that only purposeful losses count.210  For that reason, the pur-
poseful loss amendment risks excluding the blameworthy conduct of a signif-
icant subset of culpable defendants.  Specifically, it excludes defendants who 
did not have a conscious desire to inflict a loss because their conduct was in 
 
or reason to believe”); id. § 2K2.1(b)(6) (noting the mens rea as “knowledge, intent, 
or reason to believe”); id. § 2M5.3(b) (noting the mens rea as “intent, knowledge, or 
reason to believe”); id. § 2M5.3 cmt. (noting the mens rea as “known or intended”); 
id. § 2X3.1 cmt. (noting the mens rea as “known or intended”). 
 204. See Manatau, 647 F.3d at 1052–53. 
 205. Id. at 1055–56. 
 206. Id. at 1050. 
 207. Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 80 Fed. Reg. 25782, 25791 
(notice of submission to Congress of amendments May 5, 2015). 
 208. An “All Federal” search on Westlaw of (“intended loss” and purpose! and 
(“2.02” or “conscious object”)) returns Manatau as the only result, and neither Mana-
tau nor the Commission cites any cases on point. 
 209. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 cmt 3(A)(2) (U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N 2015) (emphasis added). 
 210. See id. 
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some way attenuated from their victims’ losses – for example, because the 
defendant did not stand to benefit directly from the loss, or because there was 
merely a risk of loss.  Many defendants convicted of the following offenses 
will be able to make strong arguments that they did not purpose any loss at 
all: 
 
 loan and mortgage fraud; 
 financial reporting fraud; 
 contracting fraud (i.e., the defendant’s fraudulent assertion that he or 
she is qualified for a contract or can meet its terms); 
 fraud in applying for government programs or benefits; 
 crimes involving the resale of stolen checks, credit cards, or other 
property to a third-party for a flat fee; 
 sales of securities or other property whose value is genuinely un-
known by the defendant; 
 crimes conducted on the behalf of others, including by employees on 
behalf of their employers; and 
 certain Ponzi schemes. 
 
Defendants convicted of the above crimes are blameworthy, which is 
why their conduct is criminalized in the first place.  But these offenders are 
culpable not because they consciously desired to inflict losses on their vic-
tims, but rather because they either knew (in MPC terms) that a loss was sub-
stantially certain to occur, or they were willing to risk a loss.  While knowing 
about or risking a loss may be less blameworthy than purposing one, if judges 
adopt the MPC/Manatau interpretation of “purpose,” they may reach the con-
clusion that such offenders did not have any intended loss at all. 
Take, for example, the facts of United States v. Confredo.211  Confredo 
was a former loan officer who helped hundreds of small businesses submit 
fraudulent loan applications for amounts over $24 million.212  In exchange, he 
received up-front fees and a percentage of the loan amounts, totaling about $2 
million.213  Since some loans were denied and others were partially or fully 
repaid, the banks’ actual losses were approximately $9 million.214  Confredo 
argued that because he believed that the bank would deny some of the loan 
requests and that his clients would repay a portion of what they owed, his 
intended loss was between $10 and $20 million.215  The district court, howev-
er, concluded as a matter of law that Confredo’s intended loss was the full 
$24 million he requested for his clients.216  The Second Circuit remanded the 
 
 211. 528 F.3d 143, 145 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 212. Id. at 145–46. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. at 146. 
 215. Id. at 148. 
 216. Id. 
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case.217  It held that although the district court could start with the presump-
tion that Confredo intended a loss equal to the total loan request, he must be 
given the chance to show “a subjective intent to cause a loss of less than the 
aggregate amount of the loans.”218 
How would the district court evaluate Confredo’s intended loss under 
the new purposeful loss amendment?  If the court follows Manatau and the 
MPC’s definition of “purpose,” the loss calculation will turn on whether it 
was Confredo’s “conscious object” to inflict pecuniary harm on his clients’ 
lenders.  But Confredo received no financial benefit from the loan defaults; in 
fact, the likelihood of his crime being discovered would only increase if his 
clients defaulted.  In addition, any losses that the lenders might suffer would 
not occur until after Confredo’s role in the crime was complete.  The link 
between his actions and the lenders’ possible losses is so attenuated that it is 
difficult to conclude that he acted for the purpose of causing their losses, even 
though he certainly foresaw the risk that some of his clients would not repay 
their loans in full. 
The Department of Justice’s comments on the Commission’s proposed 
intended loss amendment raised this same concern: 
The Commission’s proposal to limit the definition of “intended loss” 
to that which the defendant purposefully sought to inflict would effec-
tively eviscerate use of the intended loss criterion in determining loss.  
In many fraud cases, defendants routinely assert, with some persua-
siveness, that they never intended to inflict any pecuniary harm on 
their victims, and that they genuinely believed that their victims would 
receive the benefits that they were originally promised . . . .219 
On the one hand, the purposeful loss amendment will not “eviscerate” the 
intended loss calculation in conventional frauds or thefts where defendants 
act with the conscious object of transferring property directly from their vic-
tims to themselves.  Nor is there a valid defense for a defendant who acts 
with multiple purposes, one of which is to inflict a loss; for example, a de-
fendant who steals $20,000 because he wants to buy a new car has the con-
 
 217. Id. at 156. 
 218. Id. at 152–53.  In so holding, the Second Circuit endorsed the Third Circuit’s 
analysis in United States v. Yeaman, 194 F.3d 442, 460 (3d Cir. 1999) (“Intended loss 
refers to the defendant’s subjective expectation, not to the risk of loss to which he 
may have exposed his victims.”). 
 219. U.S. Department of Justice Views on the Proposed Amendments to the Fed-
eral Sentencing Guidelines and Issues for Comment Published by the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission in the Federal Register on January 16, 2015, U.S. DEP’T JUST. 28–29 
(Mar. 9, 2015), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/amendment-process 
/public-hearings-and-meetings/20150312/DOJ.pdf. 
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scious object of inflicting a $20,000 loss, even if it is not his ultimate goal, 
because it is a necessary intermediate step toward that goal.220 
For frauds like the one at issue in Confredo, however, if courts apply the 
MPC definition of purpose, the attenuation between the criminal offense and 
the victim’s losses will often lead to the conclusion that there was no intended 
loss at all.  The sentences for such defendants would then be driven predomi-
nantly by actual losses.  But because actual loss is primarily a proxy for harm, 
it can vary dramatically based on factors that have little bearing on culpabil-
ity, such as how quickly the defendant is apprehended. 
Judges in such cases may be inclined to interpret intended loss as if the 
November 2015 amendment did not define intent as purpose.221  But they will 
have to explain why the Commission specifically inserted the word “purpose” 
into the Guidelines yet did not intend for it to have its conventional MPC 
definition – the same one argued for in Manatau, whose reasoning the Com-
mission expressly endorsed when adopting the new amendment.  The varying 
fidelity to which courts adhere to the MPC/Manatau definition of “purpose” 
risks becoming a new source of disparity and unpredictability in the applica-
tion of the fraud Guidelines.  And even though the purposeful loss amend-
ment is likely to have a downward effect on average Guidelines sentences – it 
will be more difficult for the government to prove that a loss was “purposed” 
rather than merely “intended” – a new definition of intended loss that seem-
ingly excludes large swaths of culpable conduct seems like an unnecessarily 
capricious means to that worthy end. 
C.  Expected Loss as an Alternative Measure of Culpability 
Ironically, in the same Federal Register notice in which it announced the 
purposeful loss amendment, the Commission cited cases that take an ap-
proach to measuring intended loss that is distinctly different from the pur-
poseful loss amendment – one that fully endorses a subjective inquiry without 
excluding a significant subset of blameworthy defendants.222  This alternative 
 
 220. See GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, THE MENTAL ELEMENT IN CRIME 10, 14 (1965) 
(“[T]he consequence need not be desired as an end in itself; it may be desired as a 
means to another end. . . . There may be a series of ends, each a link in a chain of 
purpose.  Every link in the chain, when it happens, is an intended consequence of the 
original act.”). 
 221. As the typical factfinders of intended loss, judges have significant discretion 
to decide whether a defendant’s claims about his or her purpose are credible.  For 
example, in the post-purposeful-loss-amendment case of United States v. Pollock, the 
district court held that a defendant who diverted a disbursement from his lender pur-
posed a loss equal to the entire disbursement, even though he claimed that “we just 
thought we would pay the bills and just continue forward.”  No. 3:14-cr-00186-BR, 
2016 WL 1718192, at *4 (D. Or. Apr. 29, 2016).  The court concluded that “he never 
intended to repay the bank for its loss; i.e., Defendant’s actions belie his words.”  Id. 
 222. See Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 80 Fed. Reg. 25782, 
25791 (notice of submission to Congress of amendments May 5, 2015) (citing United 
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approach was expressed concisely in the Third Circuit case United States v. 
Diallo: “[W]e look to the defendant’s subjective expectation . . . .”223  In oth-
er words, the Third Circuit takes the same “expected loss” approach used by 
the First Circuit, but it looks to the defendant’s subjective expectations, rather 
than those of an objectively reasonable person.  The Second Circuit endorsed 
this same test in United States v. Confredo and explained how it would apply 
to the facts of that case: “A defendant who applied for, or caused someone 
else to apply for, a $1 million loan, fully expecting at least $250,000 to be 
repaid, intended a loss of no more than $750,000 . . . .”224 
The analytic focus of the subjectively intended loss inquiry is on the 
blameworthiness of the defendant’s decision to engage in conduct with the 
expectation that it would inflict losses on others.  The decision to act despite a 
consciously known risk of harm is seen by some theorists as the necessary 
element of all criminal culpability.225  The MPC captures this culpable state 
of mind in its definition of recklessness, which states that “[a] person acts 
recklessly . . . when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable 
risk that the material element [of the offense] exists or will result from his 
conduct.”226  Recklessness is the default mental state that must be shown to 
impose criminal liability under the MPC,227 and for the same reason – i.e., 
 
States v. Diallo, 710 F.3d 147, 151 (3d Cir. 2013), United States v. Confredo, 528 
F.3d 143, 152 (2d Cir. 2008), and United States v. Sanders, 343 F.3d 511, 527 (5th 
Cir. 2003)). 
 223. 710 F.3d 147, 151 (3d Cir. 2013); see also United States v. Yeaman, 194 
F.3d 422, 460 (3d Cir. 1999) (“Intended loss refers to the defendant’s subjective ex-
pectation, not to the risk of loss to which he may have exposed his victims.”) (citing 
United States v. Kopp, 951 F.2d 521, 529–31 (3d Cir. 1991)). 
 224. 528 F.3d 143, 152 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 225. See, e.g., Larry Alexander, Insufficient Concern: A Unified Conception of 
Criminal Culpability, 88 CAL. L. REV. 931, 931 (2000) (arguing that “the basic moral 
vice of insufficient concern for the interests of others” is the sine qua non of all 
blameworthy mental states); ITZHAK KUGLER, DIRECT AND OBLIQUE INTENTION IN 
THE CRIMINAL LAW: AN INQUIRY INTO DEGREES OF BLAMEWORTHINESS 113 (2002) 
(“The amount of harm caused and foreseen by the actor also constitutes an important 
factor in assessing moral culpability.”). 
 226. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(c) (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Official Draft 
1962).  Recklessness is one of only two mental states that is defined in the Guidelines 
(the other is criminal negligence), and the Commission’s definition tracks the MPC’s 
closely.  See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2A1.4 cmt. n.1 (U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N 2015) (“‘Reckless’ means a situation in which the defendant 
was aware of the risk created by his conduct and the risk was of such a nature and 
degree that to disregard that risk constituted a gross deviation from the standard of 
care that a reasonable person would exercise in such a situation.”); see also id. 
§ 8C2.4(a)(3) (calculating the loss amount for the purpose of sentencing corporations 
as the pecuniary harm “caused intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly”).  The Guide-
lines’ definition of criminal negligence also borrows heavily from the MPC.  See id. 
§ 2A1.4 cmt. n.1. 
 227. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03. 
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because disregarding a subjectively expected harm to another is blameworthy 
– defendants who expect that their actions will impose losses should have 
their culpability measured by the size of those expected losses. 
An intended loss measure focused on subjectively expected losses is ful-
ly consistent with the Commission’s belief that a subjective inquiry is re-
quired.228  It also provides proportional loss figures for defendants who have 
no “purposeful” loss; as one court has noted, “A rule that prohibited sentenc-
ing courts from inferring intent from a defendant’s recklessness would ap-
proach effectively creating a defense capable of eviscerating the ‘intended 
loss’ provisions of the Sentencing Guidelines for any criminal who managed 
to insulate his crime from the ultimate infliction of loss.”229  A defendant 
such as Confredo, who subjectively understood that at least some of his cli-
ents would default on their loans, expected that his scheme would result in 
some amount of loss to the lenders involved and should be held responsible 
for acting in the face of that risk. 
The expected loss analysis will usually start with objective facts about 
the nature of the crime that were known to the defendant: the number of sto-
len credit cards, the amount of the fraudulent loan request, the number of 
telemarketing calls made, etc.  A secondary question about how the defendant 
subjectively interpreted those facts will generally follow: what did the de-
fendant understand about the average credit limit on the cards?  The likeli-
hood that he or she could repay the loan?  The success rate of the fraudulent 
telemarketing calls?  Multiplying the defendant’s subjective assessment of a 
given outcome by the likelihood of that outcome would generate the expected 
loss amount; if Confredo thought there was a 40% chance that his client 
would default on a $1 million loan, the expected loss was $400,000.230 
If a defendant had no discernible expectations, then there should be a 
presumption that he or she expected the scheme to succeed in full; people 
generally expect to succeed in their endeavors.231  But the presumption  
 228. Although the expected loss measure’s ability to grade culpability proportion-
ally is at issue here, some scholars argue that it is also the appropriate metric for max-
imizing the deterrent effect of sanctions.  See Cohen, supra note 122, at 524 (“Before 
deciding on whether or not to commit a crime, the ‘expected’ loss is all that can be 
estimated, and thus the potential offender relies upon that measure in determining 
whether or not to commit a crime.  The fact that he will be punished on the realization 
of actual loss does not change that decision calculus . . . .”). 
 229. United States v. Harris, 597 F.3d 242, 255 (5th Cir. 2010). 
 230. The same basic formula can accommodate more complex calculations, such 
as crimes involving a small risk of an enormous loss.  In most cases, evidence of the 
defendant’s expectations will not come in neat percentages, but the overall goal 
would be to account for the defendant’s understanding of the amount at issue and the 
concomitant risk that some or all of it would be lost. 
 231. Once expected losses are included in the loss calculation, the issue arises 
whether a defendant who acts with the purpose of stealing $1 million is more culpable 
than one who merely acts with the expectation that $1 million will be lost.  Compar-
ing defendants with different mental states is unavoidable if intended loss is the one-
dimensional metric for measuring culpability and more than one mental state is cul-
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should not be so strong that “the full value of property recklessly jeopardized 
by a defendant’s crime may be considered part of his intended loss”232 be-
cause this would treat someone who applies for a fraudulent loan fully ex-
pecting to repay it the same as a con artist who applies for a loan but skips 
town as soon as the check clears.233  While both are culpable, the subjectively 
expected loss measure properly grades the latter defendant as more culpable 
than the former.  If defendants have evidence that they expected losses to be 
lower than they would have appeared to a reasonable person, courts should 
take that evidence into account rather than “mechanically” setting intended 
loss equal to the amount placed at risk.234 
Any subjective intended loss measure will necessarily raise some tricky 
evidentiary issues.235  While this might be an argument in favor of evaluating 
culpability on dimensions other than loss,236 there is no reason to believe that 
an expected loss test would be more difficult to apply than the purposeful loss 
inquiry currently required.  Additionally, the Guidelines instruct that the loss 
amount under any test must only be proven by a preponderance of the evi-
dence, and the resulting estimate need only be reasonable, not precise.237 
 
pable.  See Cohen, supra note 122, at 524–25.  Since it would be unusual (though not 
impossible) for a defendant to successfully demonstrate that even though he or she 
purposed a loss, he or she did not expect it to succeed, the expected loss calculation 
would serve as a discount to the purposeful loss amount in some cases. 
 232. Harris, 597 F.3d at 252; see also United States v. Lauer, 148 F.3d 766, 768 
(7th Cir. 1998) (holding that intended loss should equal “the amount that the defend-
ant placed at risk by misappropriating money or other property”); id. (“That amount 
measures the gravity of his crime; that he may have hoped or even expected a miracle 
that would deliver his intended victim from harm is both impossible to verify and 
peripheral to the danger that the crime poses to the community.”). 
 233. See, e.g., United States v. Schneider, 930 F.2d 555, 558 (7th Cir. 1991) (dis-
tinguishing between “a true con artist” who pockets a contract price with no intention 
of rendering any services, and a fraud committed “to obtain a contract that the de-
fendant might otherwise not obtain, but [which] he means to perform”).  Evidence of 
past practice will often be the strongest evidence that a defendant’s expectations were 
lower than they might appear.  See id. at 559 (noting the defendants’ history of suc-
cessfully performing government contracts). 
 234. See United States v. Diallo, 710 F.3d 147, 152 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Unit-
ed States v. Geevers, 226 F.3d 186, 193–94 (3d Cir. 2000)). 
 235. See Bowman, The 2001 Federal Economic Crime Sentencing Reform, supra 
note 101, at 44 (noting that subjective measures of intent “permit[] the defendant to 
limit his sentencing exposure by making difficult-to-disprove claims about his benev-
olent intentions or about this failure to consider the likely consequences of his 
crime”).  Cf. Kevin Jon Heller, The Cognitive Psychology of Mens Rea, 99 J. CRIM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 317 (2009) (describing the psychological process through which 
juries evaluate the subjective mental states of defendants). 
 236. See infra Part V. 
 237. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6A1.3 cmt. (U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N 2015) (“The Commission believes that use of a preponderance of the evi-
dence standard is appropriate to meet due process requirements and policy concerns 
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In sum, although the Commission amended the definition of intended 
loss for the purpose of improving the “fit” between intended loss and culpa-
bility, by limiting intended loss to defendants who purposely inflicted a loss, 
it appears to have excluded a significant subset of culpable defendants.  In 
doing so, the Commission missed an opportunity to redefine intended loss in 
terms of subjectively expected loss, a reform that would have clarified the 
meaning of the loss calculation and ensured that there is an intended loss fig-
ure for all defendants who expected to inflict a loss. 
V.  RETHINKING RULE-BASED PROXIES FOR CULPABILITY 
Even though defining intended loss to include losses that were subjec-
tively expected would improve the fit between loss and culpability, it would 
still be a severely under-inclusive rule.  Many aspects of blameworthiness – 
including nonpecuniary factors like motive, the defendant’s role in the of-
fense, and the duration of the offense – would remain unaccounted for under 
any rule based on loss.  This Part uses the rules/standards framework to con-
sider approaches other than measuring intended loss – however defined – to 
grade defendants by culpability at sentencing. 
A.  Loss and Proportional Sentencing 
Discomfort with sentencing rules tied to loss calculations is as old as the 
use of loss in sentencing.  Specifically, there has been a longstanding concern 
that a one-dimensional focus on pecuniary harm often results in overly harsh 
punishment.  Writing in the early 1600s, Sir Henry Spelman noted that the 
twelve-pence trigger for grand larceny – a capital offense – had not changed 
in 800 years and quipped, “[W]hile everything else [has] risen in its nominal 
value, and become dearer, the life of man ha[s] continually grown cheap-
er.”238  Furthermore, Blackstone observed that jury nullification – which he 
called “pious perjury” – was widespread in larceny cases: “[T]he mercy of 
juries will often make them strain a point, and bring in larceny to be under the 
value of twelvepence, when it is really of much greater value.”239 
Recent sentencing statistics strongly indicate that federal judges are sim-
ilarly convinced that the loss calculation in Section 2B1.1 often results in 
disproportionate sentences.  In general, the larger the percentage of a Guide-
lines recommendation that is attributable to the loss enhancement, the more 
likely it is that the judge will issue a downward departure.  For example,  
in resolving disputes regarding application of the guidelines to the facts of a case.”); 
id. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(C). 
 238. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *237. 
 239. Id. at *238; see also THOMAS ANDREW GREEN, VERDICT ACCORDING TO 
CONSCIENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON THE ENGLISH CRIMINAL TRIAL JURY 1200–1800 286 
(1985) (“Many capital defendants [in the mid-1700s] were saved by an undervalua-
tion or a ‘finding’ of simple larceny instead of burglary . . . and thus were convicted 
of an offense for which transportation or whipping were the prescribed sanctions.”). 
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about 84% of fraud sentences in which zero offense levels have been added 
for loss are within the Guidelines range, compared to about 27% of sentences 
in which twenty or more offense levels were added based on the amount 
lost.240  Recent research indicates that this phenomenon is best explained by 
judges’ distaste for the loss enhancement specifically and not merely for high 
fraud sentences in general.241  For example, an offender whose final offense 
level is driven primarily by the loss enhancement is more likely to be sen-
tenced below-range than one with an identical final offense level that was 
more heavily influenced by enhancements other than loss.242 
More generally, the data also show enormous variation in the calculated 
loss amount for any given sentence length.243  If all defendants with the same 
final sentence are ranked by the loss attributed to them, the correlation be-
tween final sentences and loss is surprisingly weak.  For example, between 
2006 and 2012, the middle two quartiles of defendants who were sentenced to 
twelve months in prison had losses ranging from $31,512 to $204,527; one 
defendant with a twelve-month sentence had a loss amount of nearly $3 bil-
lion.244  Similarly, the same given loss amount is often associated with final 
sentences of varying lengths; for example, the middle two quartiles of of-
fenders convicted of having caused a $150,000 loss were assigned sentences 
that ranged from one to five years.245 
These statistics indicate that there is a fundamental problem with the 
way that Section 2B1.1 translates loss into a sentencing enhancement.  More 
specifically, the rules for converting loss into a sentencing recommendation 
systematically exaggerate loss’s influence on recommended sentences; fewer 
than 2% of fraud sentences are above-range.246 
Perhaps the simplest explanation for why the fraud Guidelines produce 
disproportionate sentences is that the loss table is miscalibrated – too many 
offense levels are added for any given loss amount.  The proper baseline for 
fraud sentences has been controversial since the first Commission decided 
 
 240. Sentencing and Guideline Application Information for § 2B1.1 Offenders: 
United States Sentencing Commission Symposium on Economic Crime, U.S. SENT’G 
COMMISSION 8 fig. 8 (2012), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-
publications/research-projects-and-surveys/economic-crimes/20130918-19-
symposium/Sentencing_Guideline_Application_Info.pdf [hereinafter Sentencing and 
Guideline Application Information for § 2B1.1 Offenders].  See also § 2B1.1.  These 
statistics were compiled for the fiscal year of 2012 using the 2011 Guidelines.  See 
Sentencing and Guideline Application Information for § 2B1.1 Offenders, supra. 
 241. Allenbaugh, supra note 96, at 21, 23.  This research included every fraud 
sentence issued between fiscal years 2006 and 2012.  Id. 
 242. Id. at 23 n.22. 
 243. Id. at 23–24. 
 244. Id. at 24 figs. 10, 11. 
 245. Id. at 23. 
 246. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2014 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING 
STATISTICS, supra note 3, at tbl. 27A (showing that only 1.8% of fraud sentences were 
above the Guidelines range). 
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that, while in general Guidelines sentences should be more or less equivalent 
to those issued by judges under the indeterminate sentencing regime, fraud 
sentences should be higher as a matter of public policy.247  Since then, Con-
gress has instructed the Commission to raise fraud sentences further.248  The 
upshot is that a $100,000 loss enhanced a sentence by five offense levels in 
1987 but adds ten offense levels today.249  The differences are even more 
pronounced at the highest loss levels; for example, the maximum loss en-
hancement in 1987 was eleven, and today it is thirty.250  
A recalibration of the loss table would be beneficial, especially at the 
highest loss levels.  But any reform effort to recalibrate the loss table – or 
implement the structural reforms discussed above in Part IV – would be in-
complete if it did not address the fundamentally weak correlation between a 
defendant’s intended loss and the sentencing factor for which it is a rule-
based proxy – culpability.   
B.  Alternative Approaches to Measuring Culpability 
The effectiveness of a rule depends in large part on the relationship be-
tween the empirical trigger and the policy goals underlying the rule.  The 
ostensible advantages of the intended loss rule (uniformity, predictability, 
etc.) are not sufficient to justify its use if it does not – and cannot reasonably 
be expected to – generate sentences that are proportional with respect to cul-
pability.  The relationship between intended loss and culpability is suspect on 
its face.  Intended loss incorporates such a relatively narrow set of facts relat-
ed to blameworthiness that it is not surprising that it frequently misestimates 
culpability, thereby contributing to the high rates of out-of-Guidelines sen-
tences – garbage in, garbage out.  The conceptually weak correlation between 
intended loss and culpability means that the intended loss rule, especially 
following the 2015 amendment, lends itself to a false precision that fails to 
accurately grade defendants by culpability. 
There are two promising alternative approaches to reforming the Guide-
lines’ means of grading culpability in fraud cases.  The first would replace the 
one-dimensional intended loss rule with a more complex rule that incorpo-
rates additional facts relevant to culpability.  The second, more radically, 
 
 247. See Bowman, The 2001 Federal Economic Crime Sentencing Reform, supra 
note 101, at 20–21. 
 248. See, e.g., Bowman, Pour Encourager Les Autres?, supra note 157, at 405–11 
(describing the fraud sentencing mandates in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act). 
 249. Compare U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2F1.1(b)(1)(F) (U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N 1987), with §§ 2B1.1(b)(1)(F)–(G); see also CPI Inflation 
Calculator, U.S. BUREAU LABOR STATISTICS, http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl 
(last visited July 10, 2016) (adjusting for inflation, $100,000 in 1987 would have the 
same buying power as $211,475 in 2016).  The increase would be eight offense levels 
without adjusting the $100,000 for inflation.  See § 2B1.1(b)(1)(E). 
 250. Compare § 2F1.1(b)(1)(L), with § 2B1.1(b)(1)(P). 
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would incorporate a standard-based assessment of culpability within the pre-
dominantly rule-based framework of the Guidelines. 
1.  A Rule-Based “Culpability Score” 
It is doubtful that there is a single metric that could serve as a better 
rule-based proxy for culpability than intended loss, especially if it were rede-
fined to incorporate subjectively expected losses.  Culpability is multifaceted 
by nature, and any single factor would be prone to misestimating a defend-
ant’s holistic blameworthiness.251  One solution to this problem would be for 
the Commission to identify multiple facts relevant to the culpability inquiry, 
while still using rule-like directives to control its effects on the Guidelines’ 
sentence. 
A model for this kind of multipart rule already exists in the Guidelines.  
As described in Section 8C2.5, fines for corporations and other organizational 
defendants are determined by a baseline fine (set by the crime of conviction) 
that is then multiplied by a “Culpability Score.”252  The Culpability Score is 
determined by factors such as the corporation’s involvement in criminal ac-
tivity, its prior criminal history, whether a court order was violated, whether 
justice was obstructed, the existence of an effective ethics and compliance 
program, and the degree of self-reporting and cooperation.253  Within most of 
those categories, Section 8C2.5 offers several possible point values; for ex-
ample, the company’s involvement or tolerance of criminal activity can add 
one to five points to the Culpability Score, depending on the size of the or-
ganization.254  The final Culpability Score is the sum of these points. 
The use of a culpability multiplier has two notable benefits compared to 
the current role of intended loss in Section 2B1.1.  First, it incorporates a 
culpability-focused analysis directly into every sentence; there is no parallel 
to the greater-of-actual-or-intended-loss formulation that can exclude culpa-
bility considerations from a sentence altogether.  Second, the culpability 
measure can increase or decrease the baseline fine.  If a sufficient number of 
factors are mitigating, the Culpability Score is calibrated such that the multi-
plier will be less than one, and thus the fine ultimately recommended by the 
Guidelines will be less than the baseline fine. 
Consistent with the overall approach of the Guidelines, Section 8C2.5 is 
completely rule-based: all the factual triggers are empirical in nature and 
specified in advance by the Commission, as are their effects on the sentence.  
In theory, the use of a multifactor culpability test in the fraud Guidelines 
would allow for more comprehensive assessments of blameworthiness than 
are possible with the intended loss calculation, while still enabling the Com-
 
 251. See supra note 228 and accompanying text. 
 252. § 8C2.5; see also id. §§ 8C2.4, 8C2.7. 
 253. Id. §§ 8C2.5(b)–(g). 
 254. Id. § 8C2.5(b). 
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mission to promote uniformity by controlling the inputs into the sentencing 
decision. 
A multifactor rule would, however, have two significant limitations.  
First, there would still be cases that involve a relevant fact – at times, a fact of 
controlling importance – that is not included in the set of factors comprising 
the Culpability Score.  Rules require the rule-maker to identify relevant factu-
al triggers ex ante, and culpability might have too many variables to be suita-
bly captured by a predetermined list of factors.  Furthermore, some factors 
would be difficult to convert into quantifiable metrics that could be consist-
ently applied by all judges; for example, how could the blameworthiness of a 
defendant’s motive or the influence of extenuating circumstances be directly 
converted to clear, simple rules that judges could consistently apply?  The 
corporate sentencing Guidelines are able to sidestep qualitative measures – 
focusing instead on facts related to the company’s size, criminal history, and 
ethics programs – in large part because organizational defendants lack mo-
tives, desires, remorse, and other attributes related to culpability in natural 
persons. 
Second, and more importantly, the more complex the rule, the more dif-
ficult it would be to design its various components so that they fit together as 
intended.  The challenge of assigning weights to all the factors would be par-
ticularly daunting, and the complexity would grow exponentially as the num-
ber of factors increased.  The risk of redundancy and double counting would 
be magnified, and attempts to mitigate the problem (such as capping the 
number of enhancements) would further add to the rule’s complexity. 
The fraud Guidelines’ use of a complex rule that accounted for a broad-
er range of relevant facts might, on balance, produce sentencing recommen-
dations that better reflect culpability than the simplistic intended loss meas-
urement.  But the practical challenges to drafting such a rule would be signif-
icant, and it still might fail to give judges confidence that the Guidelines’ 
sentence adequately accounts for the sentencing factors in § 3553(a). 
2.  A Standard-Based Alternative 
The problems associated with identifying and weighting the factors rel-
evant to grading defendants’ culpability could also be addressed by using a 
standard rather than a rule.  A standard-based approach to measuring culpa-
bility would give judges the flexibility to determine which factors are most 
relevant and important to evaluating blameworthiness in any given case.  The 
attractiveness of this option, however, depends largely on the extent to which 
the deficiencies of standards – the inconsistency and unpredictability that led 
Congress to authorize the Guidelines in the first place – can be mitigated in 
the sentencing context. 
A recent proposal by the American Bar Association’s Task Force on the 
Reform of Federal Sentencing for Economic Crimes (“ABA Task Force”), 
composed of sixteen prominent professors, judges, and practitioners, provides 
an example of how a standard-based measurement of culpability might be 
48
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 81, Iss. 3 [2016], Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol81/iss3/6
2016] A FATALLY FLAWED PROXY 763 
incorporated into the Guidelines.255  The ABA Task Force proposal keeps the 
current base offense levels in Section 2B1.1 but reduces the number of specif-
ic offense characteristics from nineteen to three.256  Two of the offense char-
acteristics reflect harm: one measures “victim impact,” which includes factors 
such as the vulnerability of the victims, the significance of their losses, and 
nonpecuniary harms.257  The other is based on the actual – and only the actual 
– loss caused by the offense.258  The accompanying loss table reduces the 
number of loss levels to six (down from fifteen), the dollar-value of the high-
est step to $50 million (down from $550 million), and the maximum loss-
driven enhancement to fourteen offense levels (down from thirty).259 
The most innovative provision, however, is the third and final specific 
offense characteristic, which aims to account for culpability.  The proposal 
eliminates intended loss entirely and replaces it – along with all other culpa-
bility-related enhancements – with a single comprehensive culpability as-
sessment.260  The number of offense levels triggered by the assessment de-
pends on the degree of the defendant’s culpability: lowest, low, moderate, 
high, or highest.261  The proposal provides a list of nonexclusive factors that 
judges must evaluate when deciding the culpability level: (1) the mo-
tive/nature of the offense; (2) gain; (3) degree of sophistication/organization; 
(4) duration; (5) extenuating circumstances; and (6) efforts to mitigate harm, 
including voluntary cessation, self-reporting, and restitution.262  The ABA 
Task Force provides judges with a description of each factor, including sub-
factors that may bear on culpability.263  Courts are instructed to expressly 
consider all six factors (as well as any others they deem relevant) before de-
ciding on a culpability level.264 
 
 255. A Report of the American Bar Association Criminal Justice Task Force on 
the Reform of Federal Sentencing for Economic Crimes, AM. BAR ASSOC. *1, 8 
(2014), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/uncategorized/criminal_justice/ 
economic_crimes.pdf [hereinafter ABA Task Force Report] (the first two pages of the 
report are not numbered, and that is signified with an asterisk). 
 256. Id. at *2. 
 257. Id. at 5.  The Victim Impact Score in the ABA Task Force proposal is also a 
standard: “As with the culpability levels, there are many factors to consider in arriv-
ing at the appropriate level of victim impact. The court should consider how the com-
bination of these factors places the defendant’s offense in comparison to victim im-
pact in other cases under this guideline.”  Id. 
 258. Id. at 1. 
 259. Compare id. at *2 with § 2B1.1(b). 
 260. ABA Task Force Report, supra note 255, at 1–5. 
 261. Id. at *2. 
 262. Id. at 2–5.  A similar five-part structure to incorporate motive into sentencing 
has been proposed by Carissa Byrne Hessick, Motive’s Role in Criminal Punishment, 
80 S. CAL. L. REV. 89, 137 (2006). 
 263. ABA Task Force Report, supra note 255, at 2–5. 
 264. Id. at 1 (“[T]he court instead arrives at one of five culpability levels after 
considering the combined effect of all culpability factors.”). 
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The ABA Task Force concluded that “there is no workable formula for 
assigning values to each individual factor” in the culpability score, particular-
ly in light of their “almost limitless variety of possible combinations,” and 
thus the factors are not assigned specific weights.265  Instead, under the pro-
posal, “[t]he end result of the court’s analysis should be a culpability level 
that ‘ranks’ the defendant in the hierarchy of five levels of culpability for all 
defendants sentenced under this [G]uideline.”266  Unlike the current fraud 
Guidelines, culpability considerations can mitigate, as well as aggravate, the 
final sentence.  “Low” and “lowest” culpability determinations trigger a re-
duction of 3–5 or 6–10 levels, respectively.267  A “moderate” culpability rat-
ing, which the ABA Task Force says should be the most common culpability 
level, adds no additional enhancement.268  “High” and “highest” culpability 
determinations trigger enhancements of 3–5 and 6–10 levels, respectively.269  
Thus, in keeping with just-deserts theory, culpability is an independent in-
quiry that is considered in every sentence, alongside factors related to harm. 
An approach like the ABA Task Force proposal would represent a pro-
nounced shift toward a standard-based sentencing system because judges 
would ultimately be required to determine which factors best reflect a de-
fendant’s culpability ex post and case by case.  But it is far from a return to 
the unbridled discretion of an indeterminate sentencing regime.  This is so for 
at least three reasons.  First, the proposal classifies culpability into tiers asso-
ciated with specified offense-level enhancements, so a judge’s discretion to 
place a defendant in a given culpability tier can only increase or decrease the 
sentence by the predetermined number of offense levels.  Second, the overall 
weight of the culpability finding on sentencing is bounded by the other com-
ponents of the proposal, including nondiscretionary rules related to actual loss 
and the base offense level. 
Third, and perhaps most importantly, the multifactor list would channel 
and guide judicial decision-making.  The ABA Task Force proposal would 
provide judges with a list and description of factors that the Commission be-
lieves, in light of its expertise, to be most relevant to evaluating culpability in 
given categories of offenses.  With respect to the motive/nature-of-the-
offense factor, for example, the proposal provides judges with a list of four 
categories of offenses, accompanied by descriptions and an assessment of the 
relative degree of culpability typically associated with each one.270  This tax-
 
 265. Id. 
 266. Id. at 1. 
 267. Id. at *2. 
 268. Id. at *2, 2. 
 269. Id. at *2. 
 270. Id. at 2–3.  The ABA Task Force implicitly recognizes that “risk-shifting” 
offenses are distinct from purposeful ones: 
 
These [risk-shifting] offenses are not specifically intended to cause 
loss.  Instead, they shift the risk of any potential loss from the defend-
ant (or from others involved in the criminal undertaking) to a third par-
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onomy helps the judge evaluate the defendant’s motive and the nature of the 
offense in an organized and structured manner.  Approaching the mo-
tive/nature-of-the-offense inquiry in this way places the defendant’s actions 
within the context of the full scope of crimes covered by the fraud Guide-
lines, reducing the chance that a judge would lose perspective when assessing 
an individual defendant.  Furthermore, the fact that it is a requirement for 
judges to consider each of the factors identified by the Commission both en-
sures that none of the factors most relevant to culpability are overlooked, 
while at the same time discouraging judges from relying on extraneous and 
potentially irrelevant factors. 
In effect, the standard-based ABA Task Force proposal seeks to reduce 
the unwarranted disparities that can arise from standards by prescribing the 
process that judges must follow when deciding a sentence, rather than by 
preordaining the inputs to a mechanical formula.  The array of factors poten-
tially relevant to evaluating a defendant’s culpability is daunting, and judges 
asked to do so in the abstract would likely adopt many different approaches, 
some more reliable than others.  But by prescribing the process of decision-
making, the Commission can significantly enhance deliberation by reducing 
the judges’ reliance – intentional or subconscious – on biases and faulty deci-
sion-making heuristics.271  Structured decision-making models have been the 
subject of significant empirical study and have produced strong results.  For 
example, checklists – which require decision-makers to formally consider a 
set of relevant factors before coming to a decision – have been shown to im-
prove decision outcomes in many fields in which experts must make com-
plex, multivariate decisions.272  In medical and psychological settings in par-
 
ty, such as the victim of the offense.  Examples include false state-
ments for the purpose of obtaining a bank loan that is intended to be 
repaid.  Such offenses are generally less culpable than those where loss 
is specifically intended. 
 
Id. at 3.  The other categories of culpability under the proposal’s “motive/nature of the 
offense” heading are “predatory,” “legitimate ab initio,” and “gatekeeping” offenses.  
Id. at 2–3. 
 271. See, e.g., RICHARD H. THAYLER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING 
DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 94–97 (2008) (describing the 
effect of “choice architecture” on structuring complex choices); Daniel Kahneman, 
Dan Lovallo & Oliver Sibony, The Big Idea: Before You Make that Big Decision . . ., 
89 HARV. BUS. REV. 51, 51 (2011) reprinted in HBR’S 10 MUST READS: ON MAKING 
SMART DECISIONS 21, 25–27 (2013) (listing common decision-making biases and 
heuristics and methods for minimizing their effect on decision-making). 
 272. See generally ATUL GAWANDE, THE CHECKLIST MANIFESTO: HOW TO GET 
THINGS RIGHT 48–51 (2009); DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST AND SLOW 222–33 
(2011); see also Alex B. Haynes et al., A Surgical Safety Checklist to Reduce Morbid-
ity and Mortality in a Global Population, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 491, 495–96 (2009) 
(finding that the use of a surgical checklist cut deaths in half); Annegret Borchard et 
al., A Systematic Review of the Effectiveness, Compliance, and Critical Factors for 
Implementation of Safety Checklists in Surgery, 256 ANNALS SURGERY 925, 927–31 
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ticular, many assessment tools are designed to encourage “structured profes-
sional judgments” that combine empirically-based aides-memoires with a 
subjective, individualized assessment by the examining clinician.273  Struc-
tured professional judgments have been found to produce far more accurate 
diagnoses than unstructured clinical judgments, while also reducing variabil-
ity between clinicians.274  A structured decision-making approach would also 
enable the Commission to leverage its institutional expertise to provide useful 
information that individual judges might otherwise lack, such as statistics 
about sentencing practices, lists of sentencing factors that are particularly 
relevant to specific types of cases, and perspective on the full spectrum of 
defendants against which the defendant’s culpability should be compared. 
Multifactor standards have a bad reputation among some jurists and 
commentators, but the most forceful objections are blunted in the sentencing 
context.  Justice Scalia, for instance, famously argued that rules are preferable 
to standard-like balancing tests because such tests engender inconsistency, 
provide less notice to parties about what is expected of them, and effectively 
empower judges to impose their personal policy preferences.275  In the case of 
sentencing, however, modern post-Booker sentencing doctrine already re-
quires judges to use the flexible, standard-like approach mandated by Con-
gress in § 3553(a).276  The question for the Commission, therefore, is not 
whether judges should sentence defendants according to the ill-defined stand-
ards identified in § 3553(a), because Congress has already decided that they 
must.  Rather, the question now is whether the Commission can best aid 
judges as they carry out their statutory duty to account for culpability in fraud 
sentencing: is it with the intended loss calculation, or instead would judges 
would be better served by expert guidance from the Commission about how 
to evaluate culpability directly and comprehensively, as presented through a 
decision-making procedure that fosters deliberation and consistency? 
 
(2012) (concluding based on a meta-analysis of twenty-one studies that the use of 
checklists in surgery cuts the rates of mortality and complications by 40%). 
 273. See, e.g., Jerrod Brown & Jay P. Singh, Forensic Risk Assessment: A Begin-
ner’s Guide, 1 ARCHIVES FORENSIC PSYCHOL. 49, 54 (2014) (describing how, in struc-
tured professional judgment assessments, empirically-driven factors “are used as an 
aide-memoire, guiding administrators in making a categorical risk judgment”); Jen-
nifer L. Skeem & John Monahan, Current Directions in Violence Risk Assessment, 20 
CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCIENCE 38, 39 (2011) (describing the effective-
ness of structured professional judgments in predicting risk of violence in patients). 
 274. See Brown & Singh, supra note 273, at 51–52; Skeem & Monahan, supra 
note 273, at 39.  Ironically, whereas the pre-Guidelines indeterminate sentencing 
regime analogized judges to clinicians, this medical and psychological research indi-
cates that even clinicians benefit from structured guidance.  See supra notes 23–24 
and accompanying text. 
 275. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1175, 1178–80 (1989). 
 276. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(2)(A), (a)(6) (2012), partially abrogated by United 
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
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Like any standard-based framework, an omnibus culpability assessment 
would likely generate more sentencing variation than the loss calculation or a 
rule-oriented multifactor list like the Culpability Score in Section 8C2.5.  But 
if this variation is the result of judges evaluating culpability in a manner that 
is more accurate than is possible under the best available sentencing rule, then 
it should be considered a feature, not a bug, of the standard-based approach. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The Commission’s 2015 amendments to the fraud Guidelines were dis-
missed by commentators as “anti-climactic”277 and, more colorfully, a “damp 
squib.”278  Loss remains at the heart of the fraud Guidelines, and intended 
(now purposeful) loss is still the primary proxy for defendant culpability. 
The Commission’s decision to merely tweak the existing fraud Guide-
lines is consistent with the last decade of its history.  Despite the seemingly 
foundational transformation of the federal sentencing system brought about 
by Booker, one would never know anything had changed by reading the 
Guidelines themselves.  They remain as rigid and rule-oriented as ever, even 
though judges are now charged with directly applying the standards described 
in § 3553(a) in every sentence.  In short, it has been business as usual for the 
Commission post-Booker.279 
The Guidelines’ ongoing adherence to a rule-based framework is not 
necessarily problematic.  The majority of sentences still fall within the Guide-
lines range, and the Guidelines are designed to capture the same § 3553(a) 
factors ex ante “at wholesale” that judges must apply ex post “at retail.”280  
Judges’ ongoing, voluntary deference indicates that the Guidelines often suc-
ceed at promoting uniformity and predictability, while still generating rea-
sonable, proportional sentences. 
Ultimately, the role of the Guidelines should be to assist judges in ful-
filling their sentencing duties, which are now ultimately defined in § 3553(a).  
When a specific Guideline (1) has consistently high rates of departures and 
(2) is driven largely by a factual trigger that is a self-evidently weak proxy for 
a critically important sentencing factor, a reevaluation of that provision is in 
order.  When well-designed standards can do so better than clumsy rules, the 
Commission should not shy away from devolving to judges the authority to 
evaluate complex sentencing factors directly.  This is especially true when the  
 277. See Douglas A. Berman & Robert J. Watkins, Fiddling With the Fraud 
Guidelines as Booker Burns, 27 FED. SENT’G REP. 267, 268 (2015). 
 278. Bowman, Damp Squib, supra note 161, at 270. 
 279. But see James E. Felman, Reflections on the United States Sentencing Com-
mission’s 2015 Amendments to the Economic Crimes Guideline, 27 FED. SENT’G REP. 
288, 290–91 (2015) (arguing that “many of the Commissioners, given that the current 
manual was written for a binding system, believe that advisory Guidelines need not be 
so complex or require such elaborate fact finding and extensive litigation as the cur-
rent manual”). 
 280. United States v. Rita, 551 U.S. 338, 348 (2007). 
53
Guarnera: A Fatally Flawed Proxy
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2016
768 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
standard-like inquiry is channeled through a structured decision-making pro-
cedure and integrated into the broader framework of the Guidelines. 
The intended loss provision is a prime test subject for the Commission 
to use to experiment with standard-based Guidelines.  As Professors Douglas 
Berman and Robert Watkins have argued: 
Simply put, persistent emphasis on loss in modern [G]uideline calcu-
lations, even if the Commission continues to fiddle with the definition 
of ‘loss’ and other related enhancements, cannot be fully reconciled 
with the structure and intent of [§] 3553 which necessarily requires 
district judges to look to other offense factors in order to properly dis-
charge their statutory sentencing obligations.281 
A standard-based culpability provision, properly incorporated into Sec-
tion 2B1.1, would help judges evaluate culpability in fraud sentences.  As-
sessing culpability with a carefully delineated standard would improve the 
reliability of fraud sentences as a theoretical matter.  Just as importantly, 
however, it would also increase the confidence of the sentencing judge that 
the resulting Guidelines’ recommendation has accounted for the relevant fac-
tors under § 3553(a), as every sentence must. 
Despite the Commission’s good intentions, the new purposeful loss 
amendment weakens the correlation between intended loss and culpability by 
excluding a significant subset of economic crimes in which victims’ losses 
are attenuated from the defendant’s conduct.  The fraud Guidelines would be 
improved by amending the definition of intended loss to clarify that it en-
compasses losses that defendants subjectively expected to occur.  But contin-
ued fiddling with the intended loss definition can only help so much given the 
breadth of factors that bear on moral blameworthiness.  The Commission 
would do better to abandon intended loss as a fatally flawed proxy for culpa-
bility.  The Commission has the opportunity to replace intended loss with a 
new type of Guideline tailored for post-Booker sentencing practice.  This 
hybrid Guideline would capitalize on the virtues of both rules and standards 
by empowering judges to evaluate the culpability of fraud defendants direct-
ly, even as it guides their discretion through a structured decision-making 
procedure and by making available the Commission’s sentencing expertise.  
This best-of-both-worlds approach holds the promise of helping judges 
achieve reasonable uniformity in sentences while also imposing punishments 
that are proportional in light of all the relevant factors – with culpability be-
ing chief among them. 
 
 281. Berman & Watkins, supra note 277, at 268. 
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